68 BISTORT of the S C I E T K 



Account of out rejecting; entirely Mr Hume's doctrine, propofes another of 



Dr Smith. JO J r r 



his own, far more compreheniive ; a doctrine with which he 

 thinks all the mod celebrated theories of morality invented by 

 his predeceffbrs coincide in part, and from fome partial view 

 of which he apprehends that they have all proceeded. 



Of this very ingenious and original theory, I (hall endeavour 

 to give a ihort abltract. To thofe who are familiarly acquaint- 

 ed with it as it is ftated by its Author, I am aware that the at- 

 tempt may appear fuperfluous ; but I flatter myfelf that it will 

 not be wholly ufelefs to fuch as have not been much converfant 

 in thefe abftract difquifitions, by prefenting to them the lead- 

 ing principles of the fyftem in one connected view, without 

 thofe interruptions of the attention which necefTarily arife from 

 the Author's various and happy illuftrations, and from the 

 many eloquent digrefiions which animate and adorn his compo- 

 iition. 



The fundamental principle of Mr Smith's theory is, that the 

 primary objects of our moral perceptions are the actions of 

 other men ; and that our moral judgments with refpect to our 

 own conduct are only applications to ourfelves of deciiions 

 which we have already palTed on the conduct of our neigh- 

 bour. His work accordingly confifts of two parts. In the 

 former, he explains in what manner we learn to judge of the 

 conduct of our neighbour ; in the latter, in what manner, 

 by applying thefe judgments to ourfelves, we acquire a fenfe 

 cf" duty. 



Our moral judgments, both with refpect to our own conduct 

 and that of others, include two di(tinct perceptions : firjl, A 

 perception of conduct as right or wrong ; and, fecondly, A per- 

 ception of the merit or demerit of the agent. To that quality 

 of conduct which moralifts, in general, exprefs by the word 

 Rectitude, Mr Smith gives the name of Propriety; and he be- 

 gins 



