Account of 

 Ur Smith, 



34 HISTORY of the SOCIEtr. 



and demerit; which he thinks has alfo a reference, in the firft m- 

 ftance, not to our own characters, but to the characters of our 

 neighbours. In explaining the origin of this part of our mo- 

 ral conftitution, he avails himfelf of the fame principle of fympa- 

 thy, into which he refolves the fentiment of moral approbation. 



The words propriety and impropriety, when applied to an af- 

 fe<tion of the mind, are ufed in this theory (as has been al- 

 ready obferved) to exprefs the fuitablenefs or unfuitablenefs of 

 the affection to its exciting caufe. The words merit and demerit 

 have always a reference (according to Mr Smith) to the effect 

 which the affection tends to produce. When the tendency of 

 an affection is beneficial, the agent appears to us a proper ob- 

 ject of reward ; when it is hurtful, he appears the proper object 

 of punifhment. 



The principles in our nature which mod directly prompt us 

 to reward and to punifh, are gratitude and refentment. To fay 

 of a perfon, therefore, that he is deferving of reward or of pu- 

 nifhment, is to fay, in other words, that he is a proper object of 

 gratitude or of refentment; or, which amounts to the fame 

 thing, that he is to fome perfon or perfons the object of a gra- 

 titude or of a refentment, which every reafonable man is ready 

 to adopt and fympathize with. 



It is however very neceffary to obferve, that we do not tho- 

 roughly fympathize with the gratitude of one man towards 

 another, merely becaufe this other has been the caufe of his 

 good fortune, unlefs he has been the caufe of it from motives 

 which we entirely go along with. Our fenfe, therefore, of the 

 good defert of an action, is a compounded fentiment, made up 

 of an indirect fympathy with the perfon to whom the aclion is 

 beneficial, and of a direct fympathy with the affections and 



motives of the agent. The fame remark applies, mutatis 



mutandis, to our fenfe of demerit, or of ill-defert. 



From thefe principles it is inferred, that the only actions 

 which appear to us deferving of reward, are actions of a bene- 

 ficial 



