THEORY OF LANGUAGE. 391 



Mr Tooke does not explicitly say, that he considers all lan- 

 guage as consisting in expressing the connections of ideas ; but 

 he seems to make some approach to this doctrine. He ac- 

 knowledges only two essential parts of speech, the Noun and 

 the Verb. The Noun he defines to be " the simple or com- 

 " plex, the particular or general sign or name of one or more 

 " ideas." The Verb, according to him, is " the word by which 

 " we make our communication." 



In the outset of his speculations, he denies that the mind 

 has any farther concern with language than to receive impres- 

 sions, that is, to have sensations or feelings. What are called 

 its operations, he says, are merely operations of language. This 

 distinction is perhaps rather frivolous. If language is a human 

 contrivance, both the creation and the application of it must 

 be operations of the mind. He must therefore mean, that it 

 implies no farther operation of the mind than what consists in 

 the contrivance and employment of the means of communica- 

 tion. 



" The consideration of ideas, or of the mind, or things, rela- 

 " tive to the parts of speech, will," he says, " lead us no far- 

 " ther than to Nouns, that is, the signs of these impressions, 

 " or names of ideas : The other part of speech, the Verb, must 

 " be accounted for from the necessary use of it in communi- 

 " cation. The Verb is, quod loquimur ; the Noun, de quo." 



This author, however, has not given a full account of the 

 doctrine which he entertained respecting the nature of the 

 Verb. In the end of his second volume, he seems to concur 

 with other grammarians in believing that the idea expressed 

 by most verbs may be expressed also by means of a noun. 

 He says, " the verb always contains a noun, but, besides this, 

 " contains something more ;" and he proposes it as an enigma 

 for exercising the acuteness of the metaphysical world, " what 



3D 2 "is 



