THEORY OF LANGUAGE. 395 



applicable to Negations. But how will it apply to Imperatives 

 and Interrogatives ? This is a question which deserves parti- 

 cular attention. 



The author who writes in the Encyclopedia Britannica, re- 

 duces Imperative sentences to Assertions, by placing before 

 them the affirming words, " I command } r ou," or, " I request 

 " you." The imperative " veni," he says, is exactly equivalent 

 to the assertion " jubeo te venire." If all imperative senten- 

 ces are assertions, Interrogatives will easily fall under the same 

 denomination, as they are only imperatives in a different 

 form. By interrogatives, we request the person whom we ad- 

 dress to give us information. " What is your name?" and 

 " Tell me your name," are equivalent ; and both are resolved 

 by this theory into the affirmative sentence, " I beg that you 

 " will tell me \our name." The Imperative mood is thus con- 

 sidered as an abbreviation.. 



This doctrine, as applied to Imperatives, however, is unsatis- 

 factory. The brevity of Imperatives has every appearance of 

 being part of their original character. The words prefixed by 

 the author now mentioned do not seem natural to such sen- 

 tences, and tend rather to encumber than explain them. The 

 sentences into which they are then reduced are, strictly speak- 

 ing, mere assertions of a command or request, and no longer 

 the giving of a command itself. But a command must exist 

 before it can properly be asserted, and no command exists be- 

 fore the Imperative is used. 



With a view to substitute a different doctrine on this sub- 

 ject, I shall premise a few general considerations which are 

 necessary to give us right notions respecting the mutual influ- 

 ence of thought and language. I begin with remarking, that 

 we should avoid the error of supposing that language is mere- 

 ly a simple and spontaneous expression of our thoughts. A 



notion 



