396 OBSERVATIONS ON THE 



notion lias of late obtained general currency among metaphy- 

 sicians, that, when we speak, we merely think aloud, and that, 

 when we think, we merely speak in secret. The closeness of 

 the connection betwixt thought and language has thus been 

 overrated. The origin of this error may be traced without 

 much difficulty. It is to Language that we owe the greater 

 part of our information. This circumstance creates an attach- 

 ment to Language which sometimes leads us astray. Another 

 circumstance possessed of the same tendency is, that when we 

 are engaged in private thought, we very generally have some 

 nearer or more distant view of expressing our ideas to others. 

 It is also to be remarked that, independently of any direct inten- 

 tion, we are prone to indulge the pleasure of associating our men- 

 tal exercises with the imagery of conversation. Thoughts which 

 are thus associated are most apt to be attended to and revolved in 

 the mind. But it ought to be recollected that many thoughts 

 pass through the mind which are never expressed, and have no 

 necessary connection with language whatever. — We sometimes 

 hear it maintained, that we cannot think except through the 

 medium of language. This is to suppose that we never think 

 of an object, before the name of that object occurs to us. Ac- 

 cording to this theory, the name and the thing represent- 

 ed by it are not even allowed to be strictly collateral. 

 The precedence in point of time is given to the name. A 

 little reflection on the varieties which take place in the usual 

 current of thought will soon lead us to regard the opinion now 

 mentioned as immature. It will probably be found that, 

 though the occurrence of a word sometimes suggests the ob- 

 ject which it signifies, the occurrence of the object to the mind 

 as frequently suggests the word which is employed as its name. 

 Whether we think of words or of things, both the one and the 

 other are to be equally considered as Objects of thought, and in 



neither 



