THEORY OF LANGUAGE. 401 



verb. I may here observe, by the way, that I do not use the 

 the word Imperative as meaning the exercise of a power im- 

 plying positive superiority in one individual to another, but as 

 expressive of the general characteristic circumstance of per- 

 sonal influence, and including all its forms, — solicitations, for 

 example, as well as commands. An Imperative is implied 

 both in the use of Nouns and of Verbs. A grammarian may 

 call a noun a simple sign of an idea, implying no further move- 

 ment of the mind ; but he will find, on closer consideration, that 

 every person, in making use of a noun, expresses some inten- 

 tion, and that this intention gives to the simplest word the 

 force of an animated sentence. When we pronounce the 

 name of an object, we desire the person addressed to, think of 

 it, and this itself implies an Imperative act along with the par- 

 ticular idea pointed out. 



The tendency of the preceding observations is to establish 

 two positions in the theory of grammar, which are connected 

 with each other, and which differ from the doctrines usually 

 entertained* The first is, that the object of language instead of 

 being described as consisting in the communication of our 

 thoughts, should be made to consist in producing thought, 



Or in INFLUENCING THE THOUGHTS OF OTHERS, BY THE MEDIUM 



of words. The other is that, instead of considering all lan- 

 guage as affirmative, we ought to consider it as originally 



IMPERATIVE. 



Those who are averse to think favourably of this doctrine 

 will, on consideration, find it at least to be less liable to some 

 exceptions than that to which it is opposed. These exceptions 

 they may indeed despise as founded in verbal quibbles ; but it 

 ought to be recollected that, in the doctrine of words, the pre- 

 cluding of quibbles is a very important object. I hope to shew 

 that this doctrine will, with the aid of a little illustration, 



throw 



