Mental Processes in Man. 313 



the object is constructed at the bidding of certain sensa- 

 tions, which suggest to my mind the associated qualities. 

 The object is a construct. 



And here let us notice that we ascribe the form, the 

 resistance, the taste, the smell, to the object. We do not 

 say or think, " Sight -sensations inform me that there is 

 something which I call an orange, and which is capable of 

 exciting in me sensations of touch, taste, and smell ; " but we 

 say, " There is an orange, which has such and such a taste, 

 smell, and feel." In other words, we refer these sensations, 

 related in certain ways, outwards to the object, and name 

 them qualities of the object that we see. But remember, 

 that we do not necessarily or normally say or think any- 

 thing about it. We just inevitably construct the object, 

 what we build in to the construct depending upon associa- 

 tion through experience. 



At this stage, perhaps, Common Sense steps in, and, 

 shaking his head, says, with characteristic bluntness, 

 " Nonsense ; you'll never persuade me that the things I 

 see and feel around me are nothing but fictions of my own 

 mind. I don't construct them, as you call it ; there they 

 are for me to see and feel and taste if I will." Now, 

 Common Sense is a sturdy, hard-headed individual, with 

 whom I desire to keep on friendly terms. And I therefore 

 hasten to explain that I most fully agree with every word 

 that he says. The orange that I see before me is not a 

 mere fiction of my mind. I can, if I will, take it up, feel 

 it, smell it, and taste it. If it will satisfy Common Sense, 

 I will say that it is the idea of the orange that I construct. 

 Only I think that Common Sense, who has a horror of 

 roundabout and indirect statements, will not like my say- 

 ing, " I am receiving certain visual sensations related in 

 certain ways, which lead me to construct an idea of an 

 orange." He will prefer my saying simply, " I see an 

 orange." Since what he wants me to call our ideas of things 

 answer point for point to the things as they actually exist 

 for us human-folk, it is not only more satisfactory but more 

 correct to merge the two in one, and speak directly and 



