Mental Processes in Man. 321 



went to the window and saw the terrier, the construct 

 became particularized and denned. This seems to me the 

 normal order of development : first the vague, general, 

 and indefinite ; then the particular, special, and defined. 

 That which is immediately suggested at the bidding of 

 sensations received is always more or less general ; it only 

 becomes specialized on further examination physical or 

 mental — first a dog or an orange ; then this dog or this 

 orange. The more unfamiliar the object, the more vague 

 and indefinite the construct. The more familiar the object, 

 and the further our examination of it is carried, the more 

 particular and defined the construct. I would, therefore, 

 mark two stages in the process of construction : first, the 

 formation of constructs by immediate association, more or 

 less vague, indefinite, and ill defined ; and, secondly, the 

 definition of constructs by examination, by which they are 

 rendered more definite, particular, and special, and supple- 

 mented by intelligent inferences. 



I need not stay here to point out the immense im- 

 portance of this process of defining and particularizing 

 constructs, or the length to which it may be carried ; nor 

 need I pause to indicate how, through memory and 

 association, representative or reconstructive elements crowd 

 in to link or weave the constructs into more or less vivid 

 and brilliant scenes. But I have next to notice that out 

 of this intelligent examination arises a new, distinct 

 mental process, the analysis of constructs. 



This process involves the paying of special attention to 

 certain qualities of objects, to the intentional exclusion of 

 other qualities. When I cease to examine an orange as a 

 construct, and pay attention to its colour or its taste to the 

 exclusion of other properties, with the purpose of comparing 

 this colour or taste with other colours and tastes, I am 

 making a step in analysis. So, too, when I consider the 

 form of an orange for the purpose of comparing it with the 

 form of the earth, I am making a step in analysis. And, 

 again, when I consider the howl of the dog with the object 

 of comparing it with other sounds, I am making a step in 



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