350 Animal Life and Intelligence. 



more apparent, I believe, than real, from so able a student 

 of animal psychology as Mr. Romanes. Let me, therefore, 

 repeat that it is the power of analysis — the power of 

 isolating qualities of objects, the power of forming " abstract 

 ideas quite apart from the particular objects of which the 

 particular qualities happen to be characteristic," as I 

 understand these words — that I am unable to attribute to 

 the brute. Animals can and do, I think, form pre- 

 dominants ; they have not the power of isolation. 



Furthermore, it seems to me that this capacity of 

 analysis, isolation, and abstraction constitutes in the 

 possessor a new mental departure, which we may describe 

 as constituting, not merely a specific, but a generic differ- 

 ence from lower mental activities. I am not prepared, 

 however, to say that there is a difference in kind between 

 the mind of man and the mind of the dog. This would imply 

 a difference in origin or a difference in the essential nature 

 of its being. There is a great and marked difference in kind 

 between the material processes which we call physiological 

 and the mental processes we call psychical. They belong 

 to wholly different orders of being. I see no reason for 

 believing that mental processes in man differ thus in kind 

 from mental proceses in animals. But I do think that we 

 have, in the introduction of the analytic faculty, so definite 

 and marked a new departure that we should emphasize it 

 by saying that the faculty of perception, in its various 

 specific grades, differs generically from the faculty of con- 

 ception. And believing, as I do, that conception is beyond 

 the power of my favourite and clever dog, I am forced to 

 believe that his mind differs generically from my own. 



Passing now to the other vertebrates, the probabilities 

 are that their perceptual processes are essentially similar 

 to those of the higher animals ; but, in so far as these 

 creatures differ more and more widely from ourselves, we 

 may, perhaps, fairly infer that their constructs are more 

 and more different from ours. Still, the thrush that listens 

 attentively on the lawn and hops around a particular spot 



