Mental Processes in Animals. 375 



brothers. ' Is ' as the copula of a judgment implies the 

 mental separation and recombination of two terms that 

 only exist united in nature, and can, therefore, never have 

 impressed the sense except as one thing. And 'is,' con- 

 sidered as a substantive verb, as in the example, ' This 

 man is,' contains in itself the application of the copula of 

 judgment to the most elementary of all abstractions — 

 ' thing ' or ' something.' Yet if a being has the power of 

 thinking 'thing' or 'something,' it has the power of 

 transcending space and time by dividing or decomposing 

 the phenomenally one. Here is the point where instinct 

 [intelligence] ends and reason begins." I regard this as 

 one of the truest and most pregnant sentences that Mr. 

 Mivart has written. 



And when once the Logos had entered into the mind of 

 man, and made him man, it slowly but surely permeated 

 his whole mental being. Hence language is not only 

 involved in our concepts, but also in our percepts, in so far 

 as they are ours. Professor Max Muller goes so far as to 

 question whether an unnamed percept is possible. And 

 adult intellectual man is so permeated by the Logos that I 

 am not prepared to disagree with him when he says that 

 he has no unnamed perceptions. Nevertheless, the actions 

 of the speechless child and our dumb companions show 

 that they (children and animals) are capable of forming 

 mental products of the perceptual order. But here, once 

 more, we must not forget that it is in terms of these adult 

 human percepts that we interpret the percepts of children 

 and animals ; that in doing so we cannot divest ourselves 

 of the garment of our conceptual thought, that we cannot 

 banish the Logos, and that, therefore, these percepts other 

 than ours cannot be identical with ours, though they are of 

 the same order, saving their conceptual element. We may 

 put the matter thus — 



(1) * X dog-mind 1 ^ p erc epts to be interpreted in terms of (4), being 



(2) x X cat-mind > - j analogous thereto but not identical therewith. 



(3) x X infant-mind > 



(4) x x adult human mind = the percepts of psychologists, named or 



namable. 



