476 Animal Life and Intelligence. 



itself perceived, but only by the effects that it produceth." 

 " Thinking things, as such," writes Kant, " can never occur 

 in the outward phenomena ; we can have no outward per- 

 ception of their thoughts, consciousness, desires ; for all 

 this is the domain of the inward sense." How comes it, 

 then, that there is nothing of which, practically speaking, 

 we are more firmly convinced than that our neighbours 

 have each a consciousness more or less similar to our 

 own ? Certain it is that no one can come into sensible 

 contact with his brother's personality and essential spirit. 

 My brother's soul can never stand to me in the relation of 

 object. Subject he never can be to any but himself. What, 

 then, is he — his metakinetic self, not his kinetic material 

 body — to me ? In Clifford's convenient phrase, he is an 

 eject. And what is an eject ? An eject is a more or less 

 modified image of myself, that I see mirrored, as in a glass 

 darkly, in the human-folk around me. Into every human 

 brother I breathe the spirit of this eject, and he becomes 

 henceforth to me a living soul. Or, if this mode of 

 presentation does not meet with approval, I will say that 

 an eject is that metakinetic unity I infer as identically 

 associated with the organic and kinetic unity of my 

 brother's living body. And I base the close metakinetic 

 correspondence that I infer on the close kinetic corre- 

 spondence that I observe. But since the only form or 

 kind of metakinesis that I know is that of human self- 

 conscious personality, it is certain that the metakinetic 

 eject is an image of myself; it is and must be, in a word, 

 anthropomorphic. 



Too much stress can scarcely, I think, be laid on the 

 human, nay, even the individual, nature of the eject. All 

 other-mind I am bound to think of in terms of my own 

 mind. The men and women I see around me are like 

 curved mirrors, in which I see an altered reflection of my 

 own mental features. By certain signs I may be able to 

 infer in this or that human mirror graces or imperfections 

 that I lack. But throughout my survey of human nature, 

 every estimate of intellectual or moral elevation or degra- 



