﻿ATTENDING 
  THE 
  EXERCISE 
  OF 
  THE 
  SENSES. 
  515 
  

  

  in 
  regard 
  to 
  the 
  mental 
  part 
  of 
  the 
  process 
  concerned 
  in 
  the 
  exercise 
  of 
  the 
  

   senses, 
  — 
  probably 
  admitting 
  of 
  much 
  more 
  subtle 
  analysis, 
  and 
  more 
  learned 
  

   discussion 
  than 
  I 
  can 
  presume 
  to 
  offer, 
  — 
  but 
  already 
  sufficiently 
  certain 
  and 
  pre- 
  

   cise, 
  to 
  constitute 
  an 
  important 
  part 
  of 
  the 
  science 
  of 
  Physiology 
  ; 
  and 
  remarkably 
  

   in 
  accordance 
  with 
  all 
  that 
  has 
  since 
  been 
  ascertained, 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  physical 
  part 
  of 
  

   that 
  process. 
  

  

  As 
  I 
  was 
  myself 
  honoured 
  in 
  early 
  life 
  with 
  the 
  friendship 
  both 
  of 
  Mr 
  Stewart 
  

   and 
  Dr 
  Brown, 
  and 
  as 
  I 
  know 
  well 
  how 
  much 
  the 
  former 
  of 
  these 
  illustrious 
  men 
  

   was 
  pained 
  by 
  finding 
  that 
  the 
  latter, 
  when 
  succeeding 
  him 
  in 
  the 
  Chair 
  of 
  Moral 
  

   Philosophy, 
  had 
  (as 
  he 
  afterwards 
  expressed 
  it) 
  "given 
  countenance 
  to 
  some 
  

   doctrines, 
  which, 
  to 
  more 
  cautious 
  and 
  profound 
  thinkers, 
  appear 
  to 
  have 
  a 
  prac- 
  

   tical 
  tendency 
  quite 
  at 
  variance 
  with 
  his 
  known 
  principles 
  and 
  opinions 
  ;" 
  {Ele- 
  

   ments 
  of 
  the 
  Philosophy 
  of 
  the 
  Mind, 
  p. 
  502) 
  — 
  although 
  I 
  believe 
  that 
  the 
  natural 
  

   partiality 
  of 
  Mr 
  Stewart 
  to 
  the 
  studies 
  to 
  which 
  he 
  had 
  devoted 
  his 
  life, 
  had 
  

   led 
  him 
  to 
  exaggerate, 
  in 
  some 
  degree, 
  their 
  practical 
  importance, 
  — 
  still 
  I 
  feel 
  

   much 
  gratified 
  at 
  being 
  able, 
  as 
  I 
  think, 
  in 
  some 
  measure 
  to 
  reconcile 
  the 
  appa- 
  

   rently 
  conflicting 
  statements 
  in 
  their 
  writings, 
  and 
  point 
  out 
  the 
  misapprehensions 
  

   — 
  almost 
  entirely 
  on 
  the 
  part 
  of 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  — 
  to 
  which 
  they 
  may 
  be 
  traced. 
  

  

  It 
  will 
  be 
  generally 
  admitted, 
  that 
  the 
  first 
  object 
  of 
  Reid 
  and 
  Stewart 
  was 
  

   to 
  ascertain, 
  by 
  strict 
  induction, 
  the 
  existence, 
  and 
  establish 
  the 
  authority, 
  of 
  

   certain 
  Principles 
  of 
  Common 
  Sense, 
  as 
  they 
  were 
  termed 
  by 
  Reid 
  ; 
  Primary 
  Ele- 
  

   ments 
  of 
  Human 
  Reason, 
  or 
  Fundamental 
  Laws 
  of 
  Human 
  Belief, 
  as 
  they 
  were 
  

   termed 
  by 
  Stewart; 
  Principles 
  of 
  Intuitive 
  Belief, 
  or 
  Truths 
  learnedly 
  Intuition, 
  

   — 
  perhaps 
  the 
  best 
  name 
  for 
  them, 
  — 
  as 
  they 
  were 
  since 
  termed 
  by 
  Brown 
  ; 
  which 
  

   must 
  be 
  regarded 
  as 
  ultimate 
  facts 
  in 
  the 
  constitution 
  of 
  the 
  human 
  Mind, 
  equally 
  

   essential 
  to 
  all 
  reasoning, 
  to 
  all 
  scientific 
  inquiry, 
  to 
  the 
  acquisition 
  of 
  all 
  practical 
  

   knowledge, 
  and 
  to 
  the 
  daily 
  business 
  of 
  life. 
  

  

  Now 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  such 
  principles 
  of 
  Belief, 
  and 
  their 
  authority, 
  as 
  ultimate 
  

   facts 
  in 
  our 
  mental 
  constitution, 
  are 
  fully 
  admitted 
  by 
  all 
  the 
  authors 
  I 
  have 
  quoted 
  ; 
  

   by 
  no 
  one 
  are 
  they 
  more 
  clearly 
  and 
  emphatically 
  announced 
  than 
  by 
  Dr 
  Brown. 
  

   " 
  Principles 
  of 
  intuitive 
  belief," 
  he 
  says, 
  " 
  are 
  essential 
  to 
  Philosophy 
  in 
  all 
  its 
  

   forms, 
  as 
  they 
  are 
  physically 
  essential, 
  indeed, 
  to 
  the 
  very 
  preservation 
  of 
  our 
  

   animal 
  existence." 
  " 
  The 
  belief 
  of 
  our 
  identity 
  is 
  not 
  the 
  result 
  of 
  any 
  series 
  of 
  

   propositions 
  ; 
  but 
  arises 
  immediately, 
  in 
  certain 
  circumstances, 
  from 
  a 
  Principle 
  

   of 
  thought, 
  as 
  essential 
  to 
  the 
  very 
  nature 
  of 
  the 
  Mind, 
  as 
  its 
  powers 
  of 
  Perception 
  

   or 
  Memory, 
  or 
  as 
  the 
  power 
  of 
  Reasoning 
  itself; 
  on 
  the 
  essential 
  validity 
  of 
  which, 
  

   and 
  consequently 
  on 
  the 
  intuitive 
  belief 
  of 
  some 
  first 
  truth 
  on 
  which 
  it 
  is 
  founded, 
  

   every 
  objection 
  to 
  the 
  force 
  of 
  these 
  very 
  truths 
  themselves 
  must 
  ultimately 
  rest. 
  

   To 
  object 
  is 
  to 
  argue; 
  and 
  to 
  argue 
  is 
  to 
  assert 
  the 
  validity 
  of 
  argument, 
  and 
  

   therefore 
  of 
  the 
  primary 
  evidence, 
  from 
  which 
  the 
  evidence 
  of 
  each 
  succeeding 
  

   proposition 
  of 
  the 
  argument 
  fioAvs. 
  To 
  object 
  to 
  the 
  authority 
  of 
  such 
  primary 
  

  

  