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  PROFESSOR 
  ALISON 
  ON 
  THE 
  BELIEF 
  

  

  intuitive 
  belief, 
  would 
  thus 
  be 
  to 
  reason 
  against 
  reason, 
  — 
  to 
  affirm 
  and 
  deny 
  at 
  

   the 
  same 
  moment, 
  — 
  and 
  to 
  own 
  that 
  the 
  very 
  arguments 
  which 
  we 
  urge 
  are 
  un- 
  

   worthy 
  of 
  being 
  received 
  and 
  credited. 
  

  

  " 
  Without 
  some 
  principles 
  of 
  immediate 
  belief, 
  then, 
  it 
  is 
  manifest 
  that 
  we 
  

   could 
  have 
  no 
  belief 
  whatever 
  ; 
  for 
  we 
  believe 
  one 
  proposition 
  because 
  we 
  discover 
  

   its 
  relation 
  to 
  some 
  other 
  proposition 
  ; 
  and 
  we 
  must 
  ultimately 
  come 
  to 
  some 
  pri- 
  

   mary 
  proposition, 
  which 
  we 
  admit 
  from 
  the 
  evidence 
  contained 
  in 
  itself, 
  or, 
  to 
  

   speak 
  more 
  accurately, 
  which 
  we 
  believe 
  from 
  the 
  mere 
  impossibility 
  of 
  disbelieving 
  

   it. 
  All 
  reasoning, 
  then 
  — 
  the 
  most 
  sceptical, 
  be 
  it 
  remarked, 
  as 
  well 
  as 
  the 
  most 
  

   dogmatical 
  — 
  must 
  proceed 
  on 
  some 
  principles 
  which 
  are 
  taken 
  for 
  granted, 
  not 
  be- 
  

   cause 
  we 
  infer 
  them 
  by 
  logical 
  deduction, 
  but 
  because 
  the 
  admission 
  of 
  these 
  first 
  

   principles 
  is 
  a 
  necessary 
  part 
  of 
  our 
  intellectual 
  constitution. 
  

  

  " 
  Every 
  action 
  of 
  our 
  lives 
  is 
  an 
  exemplification 
  of 
  some 
  one 
  or 
  other 
  of 
  these 
  

   truths, 
  as 
  practically 
  felt 
  by 
  us. 
  Why 
  do 
  we 
  believe 
  that 
  what 
  we 
  remember 
  

   truly 
  took 
  place, 
  and 
  that 
  the 
  course 
  of 
  Nature 
  will 
  be 
  in 
  future 
  such 
  as 
  we 
  have 
  

   already 
  observed 
  it 
  ? 
  Without 
  the 
  belief 
  of 
  these 
  physical 
  truths, 
  we 
  could 
  not 
  

   exist 
  a 
  day, 
  and 
  yet 
  there 
  is 
  no 
  reasoning 
  from 
  which 
  they 
  can 
  be 
  inferred. 
  

  

  " 
  These 
  principles 
  of 
  intuitive 
  belief, 
  so 
  necessary 
  for 
  our 
  very 
  existence, 
  and 
  too 
  

   important, 
  therefore, 
  to 
  be 
  left 
  to 
  the 
  casual 
  discovery 
  of 
  Reason, 
  are, 
  as 
  it 
  were, 
  

   an 
  eternal, 
  never-ceasing 
  voice 
  from 
  the 
  Creator 
  and 
  Preserver 
  of 
  our 
  being. 
  The 
  

   reasonings 
  of 
  men, 
  admitted 
  by 
  some 
  and 
  denied 
  by 
  others, 
  have 
  over 
  us 
  but 
  a 
  

   feeble 
  power, 
  which 
  resembles 
  the 
  general 
  frailty 
  of 
  man 
  himself. 
  These 
  internal 
  

   revelations 
  from 
  on 
  high 
  are 
  omnipotent, 
  like 
  their 
  Author. 
  It 
  is 
  impossible 
  for 
  

   us 
  to 
  doubt 
  them, 
  because 
  to 
  disbelieve 
  them 
  would 
  be 
  to 
  deny 
  what 
  our 
  very 
  

   constitution 
  was 
  formed 
  to 
  admit." 
  — 
  (Brown, 
  p. 
  286.) 
  

  

  The 
  principle 
  thus 
  stated 
  by 
  Dr 
  Brown, 
  and 
  some 
  of 
  the 
  illustrations 
  of 
  it 
  which 
  

   he 
  has 
  given, 
  seem 
  to 
  me 
  to 
  be 
  worthy 
  of 
  all 
  acceptation 
  ; 
  but 
  I 
  beg 
  to 
  ask, 
  how 
  

   do 
  they 
  differ 
  from 
  the 
  fundamental 
  proposition 
  of 
  Dr 
  Reid's 
  Philosophy 
  of 
  Com- 
  

   mon 
  Sense; 
  long 
  previously 
  set 
  forth, 
  for 
  example, 
  in 
  the 
  following 
  passage? 
  If 
  

   there 
  is 
  no 
  essential 
  difference, 
  then 
  I 
  think 
  it 
  clear 
  that 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  ought 
  to 
  have 
  

   distinctly 
  intimated 
  his 
  acquiescence 
  in 
  this, 
  which 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  regarded 
  as 
  the 
  

   cardinal 
  point 
  of 
  his 
  doctrine 
  ; 
  and 
  so 
  far, 
  by 
  limiting 
  and 
  defining 
  the 
  province 
  

   of 
  reasoning, 
  and 
  that 
  of 
  simple 
  observation 
  in 
  such 
  inquiries, 
  endeavoured 
  to 
  

   prevent 
  useless 
  labour, 
  and 
  irksome 
  uncertainty, 
  in 
  future 
  students 
  of 
  the 
  same 
  

   science. 
  

  

  " 
  All 
  reasoning 
  must 
  be 
  from 
  First 
  Principles 
  ; 
  and 
  for 
  first 
  principles 
  no 
  other 
  

   reason 
  can 
  be 
  given 
  but 
  this, 
  that, 
  by 
  the 
  constitution 
  of 
  our 
  Nature, 
  we 
  are 
  under 
  

   a 
  necessity 
  of 
  assenting 
  to 
  them. 
  Such 
  principles 
  are 
  parts 
  of 
  our 
  constitution, 
  

   no 
  less 
  than 
  the 
  power 
  of 
  thinking 
  ; 
  Reason 
  can 
  neither 
  make 
  nor 
  destroy 
  them, 
  

   nor 
  can 
  it 
  do 
  anything 
  without 
  them. 
  

  

  " 
  How, 
  or 
  when, 
  I 
  got 
  such 
  first 
  principles, 
  upon 
  which 
  I 
  build 
  all 
  my 
  rea- 
  

  

  