﻿ATTENDING 
  THE 
  EXERCISE 
  OF 
  THE 
  SENSES. 
  517 
  

  

  soning, 
  I 
  know 
  not, 
  for 
  I 
  had 
  them 
  before 
  I 
  can 
  remember 
  ; 
  but 
  I 
  am 
  sure 
  they 
  

   are 
  parts 
  of 
  my 
  constitution, 
  and 
  that 
  I 
  cannot 
  throw 
  them 
  off. 
  That 
  our 
  thoughts 
  

   and 
  sensations 
  must 
  have 
  a 
  subject, 
  which 
  we 
  call 
  our 
  self, 
  is 
  not 
  an 
  opinion 
  got 
  

   by 
  reasoning, 
  but 
  a 
  natural 
  principle. 
  That 
  our 
  sensations 
  of 
  touch 
  indicate 
  

   something 
  external, 
  extended, 
  figured, 
  hard 
  or 
  soft, 
  is 
  not 
  a 
  deduction 
  of 
  reason, 
  

   but 
  a 
  natural 
  principle. 
  The 
  belief 
  of 
  it, 
  and 
  the 
  very 
  conception 
  of 
  it, 
  are 
  equally 
  

   parts 
  of 
  our 
  constitution. 
  If 
  we 
  are 
  deceived 
  in 
  it, 
  we 
  are 
  deceived 
  by 
  Him 
  that 
  

   made 
  us, 
  and 
  there 
  is 
  no 
  remedy." 
  — 
  ( 
  Works 
  of 
  Reid, 
  by 
  Sir 
  W. 
  Hamilton, 
  

   p. 
  130.) 
  

  

  " 
  I 
  beg," 
  he 
  says 
  farther, 
  " 
  to 
  have 
  the 
  honour 
  of 
  making 
  an 
  addition 
  to 
  the 
  

   sceptical 
  system, 
  without 
  which 
  I 
  conceive 
  it 
  cannot 
  hang 
  together. 
  I 
  affirm 
  

   that 
  the 
  belief 
  of 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  Impressions 
  and 
  Ideas, 
  is 
  as 
  little 
  supported 
  by 
  

   reason, 
  as 
  that 
  of 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  Minds 
  and 
  Bodies. 
  No 
  man 
  ever 
  did, 
  or 
  ever 
  

   could, 
  offer 
  any 
  reason 
  for 
  this 
  belief. 
  A 
  thorough 
  and 
  consistent 
  sceptic 
  will 
  

   never 
  therefore 
  yield 
  this 
  point 
  ; 
  and 
  while 
  he 
  holds 
  it, 
  you 
  can 
  never 
  oblige 
  

   him 
  to 
  yield 
  anything 
  else. 
  

  

  " 
  To 
  such 
  a 
  sceptic 
  I 
  have 
  nothing 
  to 
  say 
  ; 
  but 
  of 
  the 
  semi-sceptics, 
  I 
  should 
  

   beg 
  to 
  know, 
  why 
  they 
  believe 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  their 
  own 
  impressions 
  and 
  ideas 
  ? 
  

   The 
  true 
  reason 
  I 
  take 
  to 
  be, 
  because 
  they 
  cannot 
  help 
  it 
  ; 
  and 
  the 
  same 
  reason 
  

   will 
  lead 
  them 
  to 
  believe 
  many 
  other 
  things." 
  — 
  (Bo., 
  p. 
  130.) 
  

  

  In 
  quoting 
  this 
  last 
  passage 
  from 
  Dr 
  Reid, 
  I 
  think 
  it 
  right 
  to 
  say, 
  that 
  notwith- 
  

   standing 
  his 
  distinct 
  assertion 
  here 
  made, 
  and 
  supported 
  by 
  Mr 
  Stewart, 
  that 
  

   the 
  evidence 
  of 
  Consciousness 
  (by 
  which 
  we 
  are 
  informed 
  of 
  the 
  acts 
  of 
  our 
  own 
  

   minds) 
  stands 
  on 
  exactly 
  the 
  same 
  footing 
  as 
  that 
  of 
  Sense, 
  and 
  is 
  equally 
  open 
  

   to 
  the 
  objections 
  of 
  the 
  sceptic, 
  it 
  seems 
  to 
  me 
  that 
  the 
  objection 
  to 
  that 
  state- 
  

   ment, 
  made 
  by 
  several 
  more 
  recent 
  authors, 
  is 
  well 
  founded 
  ; 
  because 
  what 
  we 
  

   mean 
  by 
  objects 
  of 
  consciousness 
  are 
  certain 
  changes 
  or 
  events 
  which 
  we 
  feel 
  

   within 
  ourselves, 
  and 
  we 
  cannot, 
  without 
  absurdity, 
  assert, 
  both 
  that 
  such 
  a 
  change 
  

   exists, 
  i. 
  e., 
  that 
  we 
  feel 
  it, 
  and 
  that 
  we 
  doubt 
  its 
  existence, 
  which 
  implies 
  that 
  it 
  

   may 
  not 
  exist. 
  To 
  doubt 
  the 
  evidence 
  of 
  consciousness, 
  therefore, 
  is 
  not 
  merely 
  

   to 
  do 
  violence 
  to 
  our 
  understandings, 
  but 
  is 
  to 
  assert 
  a 
  contradiction 
  in 
  terms. 
  

  

  This 
  is 
  thus 
  stated 
  by 
  Lord 
  Jeffrey 
  : 
  " 
  Whatever 
  we 
  doubt, 
  and 
  whatever 
  we 
  

   prove, 
  we 
  must 
  plainly 
  begin 
  with 
  Consciousness. 
  That 
  only 
  is 
  certain 
  — 
  all 
  the 
  

   rest 
  is 
  inference. 
  Our 
  perceptions 
  — 
  not 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  their 
  objects 
  — 
  are 
  what 
  

   we 
  cannot 
  help 
  believing." 
  — 
  (Review, 
  vol. 
  iii., 
  p. 
  283.) 
  And 
  the 
  same 
  ground 
  is 
  

   taken 
  by 
  Sir 
  Wm. 
  Hamilton 
  thus 
  : 
  " 
  There 
  is 
  no 
  scepticism 
  possible 
  touching 
  the 
  

   facts 
  of 
  consciousness 
  in 
  themselves. 
  We 
  cannot 
  doubt 
  that 
  the 
  phenomena 
  of 
  

   consciousness 
  are 
  real, 
  in 
  so 
  far 
  as 
  we 
  are 
  conscious 
  of 
  them, 
  because 
  such 
  doubt, 
  

   being 
  an 
  act 
  of 
  consciousness, 
  would 
  contradict, 
  and 
  consequently 
  annihilate 
  itself: 
  

   but 
  all 
  beyond 
  the 
  mere 
  phenomena 
  of 
  which 
  we 
  are 
  conscious, 
  we 
  may, 
  without 
  

   fear 
  of 
  self-contradiction 
  at 
  least, 
  doubt." 
  — 
  ( 
  Works 
  o/Reid, 
  &c, 
  p. 
  129.) 
  

   vol. 
  xx. 
  part 
  iv. 
  7 
  a 
  

  

  