﻿520 
  PROFESSOR 
  ALISON 
  ON 
  THE 
  BELIEF 
  

  

  it 
  denotes." 
  — 
  {Lectures, 
  vol. 
  ii., 
  p. 
  47.) 
  And 
  he 
  made 
  a 
  very 
  ingenious 
  attempt 
  

   (such 
  as 
  Dr 
  Reid, 
  from 
  his 
  expressions 
  above 
  quoted, 
  I 
  think, 
  must 
  have 
  approved) 
  

   to 
  explain 
  how 
  the 
  notion 
  of 
  the 
  primary 
  qualities 
  of 
  matter 
  may 
  be 
  gradually 
  

   formed, 
  by 
  the 
  help 
  of 
  experience, 
  in 
  the 
  mind. 
  

  

  " 
  Perception," 
  he 
  says, 
  " 
  is 
  only 
  another 
  name 
  for 
  certain 
  associations 
  and 
  

   inferences 
  which 
  flow 
  from 
  other 
  more 
  general 
  principles 
  of 
  the 
  mind." 
  — 
  (Vol. 
  i., 
  

   p 
  569.) 
  He 
  then 
  goes 
  on 
  to 
  explain 
  how, 
  by 
  means 
  of 
  certain 
  sensations, 
  and 
  

   particularly 
  of 
  those 
  muscular 
  sensations, 
  consequent 
  on 
  the 
  excitement 
  of 
  in- 
  

   stinctive 
  and 
  voluntary 
  muscular 
  actions, 
  which 
  he 
  has 
  so 
  ingeniously 
  illus- 
  

   trated, 
  the 
  notion 
  of 
  the 
  qualities 
  of 
  matter 
  may 
  be 
  gradually 
  introduced 
  into 
  the 
  

   human 
  mind. 
  He 
  distinguishes 
  the 
  Primary 
  Qualities 
  of 
  Matter, 
  I 
  think, 
  more 
  

   satisfactorily 
  than 
  Reid, 
  or 
  perhaps 
  any 
  other 
  author 
  has 
  done, 
  as 
  the 
  different 
  

   modifications 
  of 
  Extension 
  and 
  Resistance 
  ; 
  " 
  the 
  very 
  notion 
  of 
  which 
  combined," 
  

   he 
  says, 
  " 
  seems 
  necessarily 
  to 
  indicate 
  a 
  material 
  cause, 
  or 
  rather, 
  is 
  truly 
  that 
  

   which 
  constitutes 
  our 
  very 
  notion 
  of 
  Matter." 
  — 
  (Vol. 
  i., 
  p. 
  574.) 
  

  

  I 
  am 
  much 
  inclined 
  to 
  think, 
  although 
  I 
  would 
  not 
  state 
  it 
  as 
  certain, 
  that 
  his 
  

   very 
  ingenious 
  analysis 
  of 
  the 
  mental 
  acts 
  suggesting 
  this 
  notion, 
  as 
  it 
  is 
  often 
  sug- 
  

   gested, 
  — 
  i. 
  e., 
  regarding 
  it 
  as 
  the 
  natural 
  result 
  of 
  muscular 
  sensations, 
  repeatedly 
  

   excited, 
  and 
  again 
  obstructed, 
  in 
  different 
  degrees, 
  at 
  different 
  points, 
  and 
  for 
  different 
  

   periods 
  of 
  time, 
  — 
  is 
  correct 
  ; 
  if 
  so, 
  it 
  affords 
  as 
  good 
  an 
  example 
  as 
  can 
  be 
  given, 
  of 
  

   what 
  his 
  friend 
  Mr 
  Campbell 
  called 
  " 
  the 
  mysterious, 
  and 
  almost 
  miraculous 
  

   subtilty 
  of 
  his 
  mind." 
  But 
  I 
  maintain 
  with 
  confidence, 
  that 
  it 
  does 
  not 
  in 
  the 
  

   slightest 
  degree 
  invalidate 
  the 
  statement 
  of 
  Reid, 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  Belief 
  which 
  accom- 
  

   panies 
  this 
  act 
  of 
  the 
  mind 
  being 
  a 
  case 
  of 
  that 
  Intuitive 
  Perception 
  of 
  Truth, 
  

   which 
  we 
  have 
  seen 
  that 
  Brown, 
  equally 
  as 
  Reid, 
  admitted 
  as 
  the 
  foundation 
  of 
  

   all 
  knowledge 
  and 
  all 
  reasoning 
  ; 
  and 
  that 
  for 
  two 
  reasons 
  : 
  — 
  

  

  First, 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  expressly 
  admits, 
  that 
  the 
  perception 
  of 
  the 
  primary 
  qua- 
  

   lities 
  of 
  matter 
  may 
  take 
  place 
  without 
  any 
  such 
  process 
  of 
  repeated 
  muscular 
  con- 
  

   traction 
  and 
  reasoning 
  thereupon 
  ; 
  and 
  that 
  it 
  does 
  so 
  in 
  the 
  lower 
  animals, 
  in 
  

   whom 
  the 
  very 
  first 
  complex 
  act 
  of 
  perception 
  may 
  often 
  be 
  observed 
  to 
  be 
  in- 
  

   stantaneous, 
  and 
  yet 
  perfect, 
  and 
  its 
  suggestions 
  correct. 
  " 
  The 
  calf 
  and 
  the 
  lamb,'' 
  

   he 
  says, 
  " 
  newly 
  dropt 
  into 
  the 
  world, 
  seem 
  to 
  measure 
  forms 
  and 
  distances 
  with 
  

   their 
  eyes 
  almost 
  as 
  distinctly 
  as 
  the 
  human 
  reason 
  measures 
  them 
  after 
  all 
  the 
  

   acquisitions 
  of 
  his 
  long 
  and 
  helpless 
  infancy." 
  — 
  (Vol. 
  ii., 
  p. 
  70.) 
  

  

  The 
  well-known 
  observation 
  of 
  the 
  chicken 
  and 
  the 
  spider 
  shews 
  that, 
  in 
  other 
  

   classes 
  of 
  the 
  lower 
  animals, 
  this 
  primitive 
  instinct, 
  or 
  suggestion, 
  as 
  he 
  calls 
  it, 
  

   is 
  still 
  more 
  obvious. 
  It 
  is 
  therefore, 
  as 
  he 
  states 
  it, 
  only 
  a 
  question 
  of 
  observa- 
  

   tion 
  and 
  experiment, 
  whether 
  or 
  not, 
  in 
  man 
  as 
  in 
  other 
  animals, 
  Nature 
  does 
  

   communicate 
  information 
  by 
  intuitive 
  suggestion 
  consequent 
  on 
  sensation, 
  — 
  which 
  

   is 
  neither 
  contained 
  in, 
  nor 
  logically 
  deducible 
  from, 
  the 
  sensation, 
  but 
  is, 
  never- 
  

   theless, 
  correct. 
  

  

  