﻿ATTENDING 
  THE 
  EXERCISE 
  OF 
  THE 
  SENSES. 
  521 
  

  

  But 
  secondly, 
  the 
  analysis 
  which 
  he 
  offers 
  of 
  this 
  act 
  of 
  mind, 
  as 
  usually 
  per- 
  

   formed 
  by 
  man, 
  only 
  professes 
  to 
  resolve 
  the 
  act, 
  which 
  Reid 
  called 
  Perception, 
  and 
  

   regarded 
  as 
  an 
  ultimate 
  fact, 
  into 
  other 
  principles 
  or 
  laws 
  of 
  thought, 
  which 
  Dr 
  

   Brown 
  himself 
  regards 
  as 
  ultimate 
  facts 
  ; 
  particularly 
  into 
  the 
  principle 
  that 
  " 
  we 
  

   must 
  suppose 
  a 
  cause 
  for 
  all 
  our 
  feelings''' 
  1 
  (vol. 
  i., 
  p. 
  56*5) 
  ; 
  the 
  " 
  intuitive 
  belief" 
  that 
  

   what 
  has 
  been 
  as 
  an 
  antecedent, 
  will 
  be 
  followed 
  by 
  what 
  has 
  been 
  as 
  a 
  consequent' 
  1 
  '' 
  

   (do., 
  p. 
  514) 
  ; 
  the 
  notion 
  of 
  Time; 
  the 
  belief 
  in 
  the 
  Suggestions 
  of 
  Memory 
  (do., 
  

   p. 
  553) 
  ; 
  and 
  the 
  principle 
  of 
  Association 
  or 
  Suggestion 
  (do., 
  p. 
  565). 
  " 
  I 
  do 
  not 
  

   conceive," 
  says 
  he, 
  "that 
  it 
  is 
  by 
  any 
  peculiar 
  Intuition 
  we 
  are 
  led 
  to 
  believe 
  in 
  

   the 
  existence 
  of 
  things 
  without. 
  I 
  consider 
  this 
  belief 
  as 
  the 
  effect 
  of 
  that 
  more 
  

   general 
  Intuition 
  by 
  which 
  we 
  consider 
  a 
  new 
  consequent, 
  in 
  any 
  series 
  of 
  ac- 
  

   customed 
  events, 
  as 
  a 
  sign 
  of 
  a 
  new 
  antecedent, 
  and 
  of 
  that 
  equally 
  general 
  prin- 
  

   ciple 
  of 
  association, 
  by 
  which 
  feelings 
  that 
  have 
  frequently 
  co-existed 
  flow 
  together, 
  

   and 
  constitute 
  afterwards 
  one 
  complex 
  whole." 
  — 
  (Vol. 
  i., 
  p. 
  518.) 
  

  

  The 
  fact 
  that 
  notions 
  are 
  formed 
  in 
  the 
  Mind 
  of 
  the 
  properties 
  of 
  Matter, 
  per- 
  

   fectly 
  distinct 
  from 
  the 
  sensations 
  which 
  excited 
  them, 
  and 
  to 
  be 
  explained 
  only 
  

   by 
  reference 
  (sooner 
  or 
  later) 
  to 
  what 
  we 
  call 
  Intuition, 
  remains, 
  therefore, 
  as 
  

   Reid 
  stated 
  it 
  ; 
  and 
  is 
  indeed 
  strongly 
  illustrated 
  and 
  confirmed 
  by 
  the 
  elaborate 
  

   analysis 
  of 
  the 
  mode 
  of 
  their 
  formation, 
  attempted 
  by 
  Dr 
  Brown. 
  

  

  On 
  the 
  other 
  hand, 
  a 
  fundamental 
  part 
  of 
  the 
  doctrine 
  of 
  Kant, 
  as 
  I 
  under- 
  

   stand 
  it, 
  and 
  to 
  which 
  Sir 
  William 
  Hamilton 
  is 
  disposed 
  to 
  assent, 
  is, 
  that 
  the 
  

   notion 
  of 
  Extension 
  or 
  Space, 
  which 
  Mr 
  Stewart 
  thought 
  it 
  important 
  to 
  distin- 
  

   guish 
  from 
  the 
  other 
  primary 
  qualities, 
  as 
  what 
  he 
  called 
  one 
  of 
  the 
  Mathemati- 
  

   cal 
  affections 
  of 
  Matter, 
  ought 
  to 
  be 
  regarded 
  as 
  a 
  necessary 
  condition, 
  or 
  native 
  

   element 
  or 
  form 
  of 
  thought 
  ; 
  and 
  that 
  a 
  belief 
  in 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  " 
  an 
  extended 
  

   world, 
  external 
  to 
  the 
  mind 
  and 
  even 
  to 
  the 
  organism, 
  is 
  not 
  a 
  faith 
  blindly 
  

   created, 
  or 
  instinctively 
  determined, 
  on 
  occasion 
  of 
  a 
  sensation 
  ; 
  but 
  exists 
  in, 
  or 
  

   as 
  a 
  constituent 
  of, 
  Perception 
  proper, 
  as 
  an 
  act 
  of 
  Intuition 
  or 
  immediate 
  know- 
  

   ledge."— 
  {Collected 
  Works 
  of 
  Reid, 
  p. 
  883.) 
  

  

  Whether 
  this 
  is 
  really 
  an 
  improvement 
  on 
  the 
  doctrine 
  which 
  he 
  states, 
  in 
  

   connection 
  with 
  it, 
  as 
  that 
  of 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  [viz., 
  " 
  that 
  on 
  occasion 
  of 
  a 
  Sensation, 
  

   along 
  with 
  a 
  notion 
  or 
  conception, 
  constituting 
  the 
  Perception 
  proper, 
  there 
  is 
  

   blindly 
  created 
  in 
  us, 
  or 
  instinctively 
  determined, 
  an 
  invincible 
  belief 
  in 
  its 
  exist- 
  

   ence"], 
  or 
  whether 
  this 
  distinction 
  is 
  really 
  verbal, 
  I 
  do 
  not 
  presume 
  to 
  decide; 
  

   but 
  I 
  think 
  it 
  must 
  be 
  admitted, 
  that 
  this 
  opinion 
  is 
  truly 
  an 
  addition 
  to 
  the 
  

   statement 
  of 
  Reid, 
  and 
  does 
  not 
  stand 
  opposed 
  to 
  it 
  ; 
  inasmuch 
  as 
  Reid 
  says 
  only, 
  

   " 
  that 
  the 
  conception 
  and 
  belief 
  are 
  the 
  work 
  of 
  Nature 
  ;" 
  and 
  this, 
  of 
  course, 
  

   does 
  not 
  exclude 
  the 
  evidence 
  that 
  may 
  be 
  adduced 
  in 
  favour 
  of 
  any 
  particular 
  

   mode, 
  in 
  which 
  we 
  may 
  suppose 
  that 
  Nature 
  accomplishes 
  the 
  work 
  ; 
  as, 
  indeed, 
  

   we 
  have 
  already 
  seen 
  that 
  both 
  Stewart 
  and 
  Brown 
  supposed 
  it 
  to 
  be 
  performed 
  

   vol. 
  xx. 
  part 
  iv. 
  7 
  B 
  

  

  