﻿522 
  PROFESSOR 
  ALISON 
  ON 
  THE 
  BELIEF 
  

  

  by 
  help 
  of 
  the 
  general 
  law 
  of 
  belief 
  in 
  the 
  continuance 
  of 
  the 
  order 
  of 
  Nature, 
  

   which 
  it 
  had 
  not 
  occurred 
  to 
  Reid 
  to 
  connect 
  with 
  it. 
  

  

  But 
  if 
  there 
  be, 
  as 
  I 
  maintain, 
  this 
  perfect 
  accordance 
  between 
  the 
  principles 
  of 
  

   Di'Reid 
  and 
  the 
  elaborate 
  attempt 
  of 
  Dr 
  Brown, 
  as 
  of 
  other 
  later 
  authors, 
  to 
  analyse 
  

   those 
  operations 
  of 
  mind 
  to 
  which 
  the 
  term 
  Perception 
  has 
  been 
  restricted 
  by 
  both, 
  

   we 
  may 
  be 
  pretty 
  well 
  assured 
  that 
  any 
  difference 
  of 
  opinion 
  among 
  those 
  authors, 
  

   on 
  this 
  subject, 
  can 
  be 
  of 
  no 
  great 
  scientific 
  importance 
  ; 
  and 
  may 
  very 
  probably 
  

   resolve 
  itself 
  into 
  one 
  of 
  those 
  partial 
  controversies, 
  involving 
  more 
  or 
  less 
  of 
  per- 
  

   sonal 
  jealousy, 
  which, 
  we 
  must 
  admit, 
  have 
  disfigured 
  and 
  retarded 
  most 
  sciences. 
  

  

  We 
  may 
  next 
  ask, 
  then, 
  how 
  it 
  should 
  happen 
  that 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  should 
  have 
  

   thought 
  himself 
  justified 
  in 
  dwelling 
  at 
  great 
  length 
  on 
  what 
  he 
  called 
  an 
  extra- 
  

   ordinary 
  mistake 
  made 
  both 
  by 
  Reid 
  and 
  his 
  followers, 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  evidence 
  of 
  

   Sense, 
  and 
  the 
  scepticism 
  of 
  Berkeley 
  and 
  Hume 
  regarding 
  it 
  ? 
  — 
  how 
  he 
  should 
  

   have 
  been 
  led 
  to 
  infer, 
  and 
  been 
  at 
  such 
  pains 
  to 
  prove, 
  that 
  there 
  is 
  no 
  real 
  dif- 
  

   ference 
  between 
  the 
  creed 
  of 
  the 
  sceptic 
  and 
  that 
  of 
  the 
  orthodox 
  philosopher 
  of 
  

   Dr 
  Reid's 
  school 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  evidence 
  of 
  sense 
  ; 
  and 
  how 
  Sir 
  James 
  Mackintosh 
  

   should 
  have 
  been 
  led 
  to 
  assert 
  the 
  whole 
  intellectual 
  part 
  of 
  the 
  philosophy 
  of 
  

   Brown 
  to 
  be, 
  by 
  reason 
  of 
  their 
  difference 
  on 
  this 
  very 
  subject, 
  an 
  open 
  revolt 
  

   against 
  the 
  authority 
  of 
  Reid 
  ? 
  

  

  The 
  reason 
  of 
  this 
  is, 
  that 
  both 
  these 
  authors, 
  and 
  other 
  recent 
  writers, 
  as 
  

   it 
  appears 
  to 
  me, 
  certainly 
  misconceived 
  and 
  misrepresented 
  the 
  controversy 
  

   as 
  it 
  was 
  carried 
  on 
  during 
  last 
  century, 
  in 
  several 
  particulars. 
  I 
  do 
  not 
  say 
  

   that 
  there 
  may 
  not 
  have 
  been 
  partial 
  mistakes 
  on 
  the 
  part 
  of 
  Dr 
  Reid, 
  particu- 
  

   larly 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  exact 
  meaning 
  of 
  previous 
  authors, 
  — 
  and 
  certainly 
  there 
  is 
  in 
  his 
  

   writings 
  a 
  diffuseness 
  of 
  style, 
  and 
  frequent 
  repetition 
  of 
  statements 
  which 
  might 
  

   have 
  been 
  more 
  impressive 
  if 
  more 
  condensed 
  ; 
  — 
  but 
  the 
  chief 
  misapprehensions 
  

   affecting 
  the 
  principles 
  which 
  I 
  have 
  stated, 
  were 
  clearly 
  on 
  the 
  side 
  of 
  Brown. 
  

  

  I. 
  It 
  was 
  a 
  palpable 
  misconception 
  on 
  the 
  part 
  both 
  of 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  and 
  Lord 
  Jef- 
  

   frey, 
  to 
  attribute 
  to 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  the 
  attempt 
  to 
  prove, 
  by 
  reasoning, 
  the 
  existence 
  

   of 
  the 
  material 
  world, 
  in 
  opposition 
  to 
  the 
  scepticism 
  of 
  previous 
  authors. 
  

  

  Thus 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  speaks 
  of 
  Reid's 
  " 
  supposed 
  p>roof 
  of 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  a 
  material 
  

   world" 
  as 
  quite 
  inadmissible 
  (vol. 
  ii., 
  pp. 
  50, 
  51); 
  and 
  Lord 
  Jeffrey 
  speaks 
  of 
  

   his 
  destruction 
  of 
  the 
  Ideal 
  Theory 
  as 
  " 
  having 
  been 
  held 
  as 
  a 
  demonstration 
  of 
  the 
  

   real 
  existence 
  of 
  matter 
  "—(Edinburgh 
  Review, 
  vol. 
  iii., 
  p. 
  281.) 
  Whereas 
  they 
  ought 
  

   to 
  have 
  observed 
  that 
  Reid 
  had, 
  in 
  a 
  few 
  simple 
  but 
  weighty 
  words, 
  disclaimed, 
  as 
  

   expressly 
  as 
  it 
  is 
  possible 
  to 
  conceive, 
  any 
  intention 
  of 
  attempting, 
  or 
  belief 
  in 
  the 
  

   possibility 
  of 
  obtaining, 
  such 
  proof. 
  He 
  says, 
  " 
  Many 
  eminent 
  philosophers 
  have 
  

   laboured 
  to 
  furnish 
  us 
  with 
  reasons 
  for 
  believing 
  our 
  senses 
  ; 
  but 
  their 
  reasons 
  are 
  

   very 
  insufficient, 
  and 
  will 
  not 
  bear 
  examination, 
  ." 
  — 
  (Collected 
  Works, 
  p. 
  328.) 
  

   " 
  Man's 
  knowledge 
  of 
  what 
  really 
  exists, 
  or 
  ever 
  did 
  exist, 
  comes 
  by 
  a 
  channel 
  

  

  