﻿ATTENDING 
  THE 
  EXERCISE 
  OF 
  THE 
  SENSES. 
  523 
  

  

  which 
  is 
  open 
  to 
  those 
  who 
  cannot 
  reason. 
  He 
  is 
  led 
  to 
  it 
  in 
  the 
  dark, 
  and 
  knows 
  

   not 
  how 
  he 
  comes 
  by 
  it." 
  " 
  The 
  pride 
  of 
  philosophy 
  has 
  led 
  some 
  to 
  invent 
  vain 
  

   theories 
  to 
  account 
  for 
  this 
  knowledge 
  ; 
  and 
  others, 
  who 
  see 
  this 
  to 
  be 
  impracti- 
  

   cable, 
  to 
  spurn 
  at 
  a 
  knowledge 
  which 
  they 
  cannot 
  account 
  for, 
  and 
  vainly 
  endeavour 
  

   to 
  throw 
  it 
  off. 
  But 
  the 
  wise 
  and 
  humble 
  will 
  take 
  it 
  as 
  the 
  gift 
  of 
  Heaven, 
  

   and 
  endeavour 
  to 
  make 
  the 
  best 
  use 
  of 
  it.'" 
  — 
  {Ibid, 
  p. 
  330.) 
  

  

  Consistently 
  with 
  this 
  statement, 
  it 
  is 
  plain 
  that 
  Dr 
  Reid's 
  object 
  (as 
  ex- 
  

   pressly 
  avowed 
  by 
  Mr 
  Stewart, 
  Phil. 
  Essays, 
  p. 
  551, 
  published 
  in 
  1810, 
  prior 
  to 
  

   Dr 
  Brown's 
  first 
  course 
  of 
  Lectures 
  on 
  this 
  subject), 
  in 
  this 
  department 
  of 
  the 
  

   science, 
  could 
  not 
  be 
  to 
  prove 
  by 
  argument 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  the 
  material 
  world, 
  

   but 
  only 
  to 
  refute 
  the 
  argument 
  against 
  it 
  ; 
  and 
  to 
  put 
  our 
  belief 
  in 
  it 
  on 
  the 
  foot- 
  

   ing 
  of 
  one 
  of 
  those 
  Intuitive 
  principles, 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  which 
  we 
  have 
  seen 
  that 
  

   Dr 
  Brown 
  fully 
  admitted 
  and 
  illustrated, 
  as 
  being 
  essential 
  to 
  all 
  knowledge 
  and 
  

   all 
  reasoning, 
  and 
  tacitly 
  admitted 
  in 
  all 
  inquiries 
  and 
  all 
  arguments 
  ; 
  therefore, 
  

   to 
  put 
  scepticism 
  on 
  this 
  subject 
  on 
  the 
  same 
  footing 
  as 
  that 
  of 
  the 
  " 
  thorough 
  

   and 
  consistent 
  sceptic, 
  who 
  will 
  not 
  believe 
  in 
  the 
  suggestions 
  of 
  his 
  own 
  me- 
  

   mory, 
  or 
  the 
  identity 
  of 
  his 
  own 
  person." 
  to 
  whom 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  had 
  explicitly 
  

   avowed, 
  that 
  " 
  he 
  had 
  nothing 
  to 
  say 
  ;" 
  and 
  whose 
  scepticism, 
  as 
  we 
  have 
  seen, 
  Dr 
  

   Brown 
  regarded 
  in 
  precisely 
  the 
  same 
  light. 
  

  

  II. 
  It 
  was 
  quite 
  a 
  misconception 
  to 
  suppose 
  that 
  the 
  creed 
  of 
  the 
  sceptics 
  of 
  

   those 
  days 
  was 
  merely, 
  as 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  states 
  it, 
  the 
  negative 
  proposition 
  that 
  the 
  

   independent 
  existence 
  of 
  the 
  material 
  world 
  cannot 
  be 
  proved 
  by 
  reasoning, 
  — 
  or, 
  

   as 
  he 
  expresses 
  it, 
  " 
  that 
  no 
  argument 
  can 
  be 
  offered 
  to 
  shew, 
  by 
  mere 
  reasoning, 
  

   the 
  existence 
  of 
  external 
  causes 
  for 
  our 
  feelings." 
  — 
  {Sketch 
  of 
  a 
  System, 
  fyc, 
  p. 
  143.) 
  

   If 
  this 
  had 
  been 
  their 
  principle, 
  the 
  words 
  above 
  quoted 
  prove, 
  that 
  it 
  must 
  have 
  

   commanded 
  the 
  entire 
  acquiescence 
  of 
  Dr 
  Reid. 
  But 
  their 
  creed, 
  — 
  so 
  plausibly 
  

   supported, 
  and 
  so 
  ingeniously 
  deduced 
  from 
  the 
  language 
  of 
  the 
  most 
  esteemed 
  

   metaphysicians 
  then 
  generally 
  known, 
  as 
  to 
  have 
  a 
  practical 
  bearing 
  which 
  we 
  can 
  

   hardly 
  realise 
  in 
  this 
  generation, 
  — 
  was 
  the 
  positive 
  proposition, 
  that 
  Reasoning 
  

   compels 
  or 
  necessitates 
  our 
  disbelieving 
  that 
  independent 
  existence, 
  as 
  involving 
  

   an 
  absurdity. 
  

  

  The 
  opinion 
  of 
  the 
  ablest 
  judges, 
  says 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  (in 
  his 
  first 
  work, 
  published 
  in 
  

   1764), 
  when 
  speaking 
  of 
  the 
  reasoning 
  of 
  Berkeley 
  as 
  to 
  " 
  the 
  evidence 
  of 
  the 
  

   senses, 
  seems 
  to 
  be, 
  that 
  these 
  arguments 
  neither 
  have 
  been 
  nor 
  can 
  be 
  confuted, 
  

   artd 
  that 
  he 
  has 
  proved 
  by 
  unanswerable 
  arguments, 
  what 
  no 
  man 
  in 
  his 
  senses 
  can 
  

   believe." 
  — 
  {Collected 
  Works, 
  p. 
  101.) 
  

  

  The 
  object 
  of 
  Hume, 
  says 
  Mr 
  Stewart, 
  obviously 
  was, 
  " 
  to 
  inculcate 
  a 
  uni- 
  

   versal 
  scepticism 
  ; 
  not, 
  as 
  some 
  have 
  supposed, 
  to 
  exalt 
  reasoning, 
  in 
  preference 
  to 
  

   our 
  instinctive 
  principles 
  cf 
  belief, 
  but, 
  by 
  illustrating 
  the 
  contradictory 
  conclu- 
  

   sions 
  to 
  which 
  our 
  different 
  faculties 
  lead, 
  to 
  involve 
  the 
  whole 
  subject 
  in 
  the 
  

  

  