﻿524 
  PROFESSOR 
  ALISON 
  ON 
  THE 
  BELIEF 
  

  

  same 
  suspicious 
  darkness 
  ; 
  — 
  not 
  to 
  interrogate 
  Nature, 
  with 
  a 
  view 
  to 
  the 
  dis- 
  

   covery 
  of 
  truth, 
  but, 
  by 
  a 
  cross-examination 
  of 
  Nature, 
  to 
  involve 
  her 
  in 
  such 
  con- 
  

   tradictions 
  as 
  might 
  set 
  aside 
  the 
  whole 
  of 
  her 
  evidence, 
  as 
  good 
  for 
  nothing." 
  

   {Phil. 
  Essays, 
  p. 
  56.) 
  

  

  The 
  argument 
  of 
  Berkeley 
  and 
  Hume, 
  although 
  expressed 
  in 
  various 
  terms, 
  

   seems 
  in 
  substance 
  to 
  have 
  been 
  always 
  this, 
  — 
  That 
  we 
  are 
  made 
  acquainted 
  

   with 
  any 
  existence 
  external 
  to 
  ourselves 
  only 
  by 
  means 
  of 
  our 
  own 
  Sensations, 
  

   i. 
  e., 
  of 
  certain 
  acts 
  or 
  states 
  of 
  our 
  own 
  minds 
  ; 
  or, 
  as 
  they 
  usually 
  expressed 
  it, 
  

   by 
  ideas 
  in 
  our 
  own 
  minds 
  ; 
  that 
  any 
  such 
  external 
  objects 
  as 
  exist 
  must 
  be 
  the 
  

   exact 
  images 
  or 
  prototypes 
  of 
  these 
  ideas 
  or 
  mental 
  states, 
  and 
  that 
  it 
  is 
  absurd 
  to 
  

   assert 
  that 
  an 
  act 
  or 
  state 
  of 
  mind, 
  whether 
  called 
  sensation 
  or 
  idea, 
  can 
  be 
  the 
  

   exact 
  image 
  or 
  resemblance 
  of 
  any 
  thing 
  but 
  another 
  act 
  of 
  the 
  same, 
  or 
  some 
  

   other 
  mind. 
  

  

  The 
  following 
  passage 
  from 
  Mr 
  Hume 
  is 
  given 
  by 
  Dr 
  Reid, 
  as 
  the 
  shortest 
  and 
  

   clearest 
  exposition 
  of 
  the 
  argument 
  which 
  he 
  had 
  anywhere 
  found 
  : 
  — 
  

  

  " 
  The 
  universal 
  and 
  primary 
  opinion 
  of 
  all 
  men, 
  that 
  we 
  perceive 
  external 
  

   objects, 
  is 
  soon 
  destroyed 
  by 
  the 
  slightest 
  Philosophy, 
  which 
  teaches 
  us, 
  that 
  

   nothing 
  can 
  be 
  present 
  to 
  the 
  mind 
  but 
  an 
  image 
  or 
  Perception 
  ;" 
  (the 
  distinction 
  

   of 
  which 
  term 
  from 
  Sensation, 
  was 
  not 
  recognised 
  by 
  Hume), 
  " 
  no 
  man 
  who 
  re- 
  

   flects, 
  ever 
  doubted 
  that 
  the 
  existences 
  which 
  we 
  consider 
  when 
  we 
  say 
  this 
  house, 
  

   and 
  that 
  tree, 
  are 
  nothing 
  but 
  perceptions 
  in 
  the 
  mind, 
  and 
  fleeting 
  copies 
  and 
  re- 
  

   presentations 
  of 
  other 
  existences 
  which 
  remain 
  uniform 
  and 
  independent. 
  So 
  far, 
  

   then, 
  we 
  are 
  necessitated 
  by 
  reasoning 
  to 
  depart 
  from 
  the 
  primary 
  instincts 
  of 
  

   nature, 
  and 
  to 
  embrace 
  a 
  new 
  system 
  with 
  regard 
  to 
  the 
  evidence 
  of 
  our 
  senses." 
  

   To 
  the 
  same 
  purpose 
  we 
  have 
  the 
  explicit 
  declaration 
  of 
  Berkeley, 
  " 
  that 
  the 
  

   existence 
  of 
  bodies, 
  out 
  of 
  a 
  mind 
  perceiving 
  them, 
  is 
  not 
  only 
  impossible, 
  but 
  a 
  

   contradiction 
  of 
  terms 
  T 
  

  

  This 
  is 
  not, 
  as 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  stated 
  it, 
  " 
  a 
  mere 
  negative 
  assertion, 
  that 
  the 
  

   existence 
  of 
  external 
  things 
  cannot 
  be 
  proved 
  by 
  argument" 
  (vol. 
  ii., 
  p. 
  55), 
  but 
  

   as 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  had 
  said, 
  a 
  distinct 
  positive 
  assertion, 
  that 
  argument 
  or 
  reasoning 
  does 
  

   compel, 
  or 
  necessitate, 
  our 
  departing 
  from 
  the 
  belief 
  in 
  that 
  existence, 
  as 
  involving 
  

   an 
  absurdity 
  or 
  contradiction. 
  It 
  was 
  these 
  positive 
  but 
  puzzling, 
  and 
  even 
  

   humiliating 
  assertions, 
  and 
  these 
  only, 
  that 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  undertook 
  to 
  confute. 
  

  

  III. 
  It 
  was 
  quite 
  a 
  misconception 
  to 
  assert, 
  as 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  repeatedly 
  and 
  con- 
  

   fidently 
  did, 
  that 
  the 
  term 
  Ideas, 
  in 
  the 
  language 
  of 
  Hume, 
  or 
  of 
  any 
  philosopher 
  

   after 
  Locke, 
  was 
  to 
  be 
  understood 
  only 
  metaphorically 
  or 
  figuratively, 
  as 
  an 
  ex- 
  

   pression 
  for 
  acts 
  or 
  states 
  of 
  mind, 
  and 
  did 
  not 
  imply 
  belief 
  in 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  

   anything 
  intermediate 
  between 
  the 
  mind 
  and 
  the 
  external 
  objects 
  of 
  sense. 
  

  

  He 
  shewed, 
  indeed, 
  that 
  the 
  term 
  had 
  been 
  used 
  occasionally 
  in 
  that 
  metapho- 
  

   rical 
  sense 
  by 
  various 
  authors 
  ; 
  which 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  knew, 
  and 
  regarded 
  as 
  a 
  proof 
  of 
  its 
  

  

  