﻿ATTENDING 
  THE 
  EXERCISE 
  OF 
  THE 
  SENSES. 
  525 
  

  

  being 
  ambiguous, 
  and 
  therefore 
  inconvenient. 
  But 
  we 
  have 
  already 
  seen, 
  that 
  

   Mr 
  Hume 
  expressly 
  asserted 
  that 
  the 
  existences 
  which 
  we 
  consider 
  when 
  we 
  speak 
  

   of 
  objects 
  of 
  sense, 
  are 
  "fleeting 
  copies 
  and 
  representations 
  of 
  other 
  existences 
  which 
  

   remain 
  uniform 
  and 
  independent;" 
  and 
  his 
  notion 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  nature 
  of 
  these 
  fleet- 
  

   ing 
  copies 
  is 
  farther 
  shewn 
  in 
  another 
  passage, 
  as 
  follows, 
  — 
  " 
  No 
  external 
  object 
  

   can 
  make 
  itself 
  known 
  to 
  the 
  mind 
  without 
  the 
  intervention 
  of 
  an 
  image, 
  and 
  of 
  

   these 
  images 
  the 
  most 
  obvious 
  of 
  the 
  qualities 
  is 
  extension." 
  1 
  ' 
  '• 
  — 
  {Treatise 
  on 
  Human 
  

   Nature, 
  vol. 
  ii., 
  p. 
  416.) 
  Has 
  not 
  Mr 
  Locke 
  expressly 
  told 
  us, 
  says 
  Mr 
  Stewart, 
  

   " 
  that 
  the 
  ideas 
  of 
  primary 
  qualities 
  of 
  matter 
  are 
  resemblances 
  of 
  them 
  ; 
  and 
  that 
  

   their 
  patterns 
  do 
  really 
  exist 
  in 
  the 
  bodies 
  themselves 
  j" 
  and 
  did 
  not 
  Mr 
  Hume 
  under- 
  

   stand 
  this 
  doctrine 
  in 
  the 
  most 
  strict 
  and 
  literal 
  meaning 
  of 
  words 
  when 
  he 
  

   stated, 
  " 
  as 
  one 
  of 
  its 
  necessary 
  consequences, 
  that 
  the 
  mind 
  either 
  is 
  no 
  sub- 
  

   stance, 
  or 
  is 
  an 
  extended 
  and 
  divisible 
  substance, 
  because 
  the 
  idea 
  of 
  extension 
  can- 
  

   not 
  be 
  in 
  a 
  substance 
  which 
  is 
  indivisible 
  and 
  unextended 
  f" 
  — 
  (Phil. 
  Essays, 
  p. 
  553.) 
  

  

  This 
  is 
  surely 
  enough 
  to 
  shew 
  that 
  what 
  Locke 
  and 
  Hume 
  called 
  Ideas, 
  had, 
  

   according 
  to 
  them, 
  a 
  physical 
  (not 
  merely 
  metaphorical) 
  existence, 
  and 
  were 
  

   essentially 
  distinct 
  from 
  the 
  mere 
  acts 
  or 
  states 
  of 
  the 
  mind 
  itself. 
  And 
  as 
  to 
  

   Berkeley, 
  we 
  have 
  the 
  distinct 
  admission 
  of 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  himself, 
  that 
  he 
  evidently 
  

   considered 
  ideas 
  " 
  not 
  as 
  states 
  of 
  the 
  individual 
  mind, 
  but 
  as 
  separate 
  things 
  ex- 
  

   isting 
  in 
  it, 
  and 
  capable 
  of 
  existing 
  in 
  other 
  minds, 
  but 
  in 
  them 
  alone." 
  — 
  (Led. 
  

   vol. 
  i., 
  p. 
  523.) 
  On 
  which 
  he 
  very 
  justly 
  afterwards 
  observes, 
  that 
  " 
  a 
  mind 
  con- 
  

   taining, 
  or 
  capable 
  of 
  containing, 
  something 
  foreign 
  within 
  itself, 
  and 
  not 
  only 
  one 
  

   foreign 
  substance, 
  but 
  a 
  multitude 
  of 
  foreign 
  substances 
  at 
  the 
  same 
  minute, 
  is 
  

   no 
  longer 
  that 
  simple 
  indivisible 
  existence 
  which 
  we 
  term 
  spirit." 
  — 
  (Led., 
  vol. 
  i., 
  

   p. 
  525.) 
  But 
  these 
  statements 
  are 
  obviously 
  and 
  irreconcileably 
  inconsistent 
  with. 
  

   Dr 
  Brown's 
  subsequent 
  assertion, 
  that 
  the 
  word 
  Idea 
  was 
  used 
  by 
  all 
  previous 
  

   authors 
  only 
  metaphorically, 
  and 
  that 
  in 
  proving 
  ideas 
  not 
  to 
  be 
  self-existent 
  

   things, 
  Reid 
  had 
  merely 
  assumed 
  as 
  real 
  what 
  was 
  intended 
  as 
  metaphorical. 
  

  

  It 
  is 
  still 
  more 
  remarkable, 
  that 
  the 
  notion 
  which 
  was 
  taken 
  up 
  by 
  Dr 
  Brown, 
  

   of 
  the 
  language 
  of 
  Hume 
  and 
  Berkeley 
  having 
  been 
  only 
  metaphorical 
  or 
  figura- 
  

   tive, 
  is 
  the 
  very 
  same 
  as 
  had 
  been 
  previously 
  hazarded 
  by 
  Priestley, 
  and 
  pre- 
  

   viously 
  answered, 
  and 
  shewn 
  to 
  be 
  inconsistent, 
  both 
  with 
  the 
  language 
  of 
  these 
  

   and 
  other 
  philosophers, 
  and 
  with 
  his 
  own 
  language, 
  by 
  Mr 
  Stewart 
  in 
  his 
  Philo- 
  

   sophical 
  Essays. 
  

  

  " 
  The 
  following 
  strictures," 
  says 
  Mr 
  Stewart, 
  " 
  on 
  Reid's 
  reasonings 
  against 
  

   the 
  Ideal 
  Theory, 
  occur 
  in 
  a 
  work 
  published 
  by 
  Dr 
  Priestley 
  in 
  1774 
  : 
  — 
  

  

  " 
  Before 
  our 
  author 
  had 
  rested 
  so 
  much 
  upon 
  this 
  argument, 
  it 
  behoved 
  him, 
  

   I 
  think, 
  to 
  have 
  examined 
  the 
  strength 
  of 
  it 
  a 
  little 
  more 
  carefully 
  than 
  he 
  seems 
  

   to 
  have 
  clone 
  ; 
  for 
  he 
  appears 
  to 
  me 
  to 
  have 
  suffered 
  himself 
  to 
  be 
  misled 
  in 
  the 
  

   very 
  foundation 
  of 
  it, 
  merely 
  by 
  philosophers 
  happening 
  to 
  call 
  Ideas 
  the 
  images 
  

   of 
  external 
  things 
  ; 
  as 
  if 
  this 
  was 
  not 
  knoivn 
  to 
  be 
  a 
  figurative 
  expression, 
  denoting, 
  

   vol. 
  xx. 
  part 
  iv. 
  7 
  c 
  

  

  