﻿526 
  PROFESSOR 
  ALISON 
  ON 
  THE 
  BELIEF 
  

  

  not 
  that 
  the 
  actual 
  shapes 
  of 
  things 
  are 
  delineated 
  in 
  the 
  brain, 
  or 
  upon 
  the 
  

   mind, 
  but 
  only 
  that 
  impressions 
  of 
  some 
  kind 
  or 
  other 
  are 
  conveyed 
  to 
  the 
  mind 
  

   by 
  means 
  of 
  the 
  organs 
  of 
  sense, 
  and 
  their 
  corresponding 
  nerves, 
  and 
  that 
  between 
  

   those 
  impressions 
  and 
  the 
  sensations 
  existing 
  in 
  the 
  mind, 
  there 
  is 
  a 
  real 
  and 
  

   necessary, 
  though 
  at 
  present 
  an 
  unknown 
  connection." 
  

  

  On 
  this 
  passage, 
  Mr 
  Stewart 
  observes, 
  " 
  To 
  those 
  who 
  have 
  perused 
  the 
  

   metaphysical 
  writings 
  of 
  Berkeley 
  and 
  of 
  Hume, 
  the 
  foregoing 
  passage 
  cannot 
  

   fail 
  to 
  appear 
  much 
  too 
  ludicrous 
  to 
  deserve 
  a 
  serious 
  answer. 
  Where 
  did 
  he 
  

   learn 
  that 
  the 
  philosophers 
  who 
  have 
  happened 
  to 
  call 
  ideas 
  the 
  images 
  of 
  

   external 
  things, 
  employed 
  this 
  term 
  as 
  a 
  figurative 
  expression 
  ?" 
  

  

  He 
  then 
  contrasts 
  it 
  with 
  some 
  of 
  the 
  expressions 
  of 
  Locke 
  and 
  of 
  Hume, 
  

   which 
  I 
  have 
  already 
  quoted, 
  and 
  afterwards 
  proceeds 
  to 
  shew, 
  that 
  it 
  is 
  utterly 
  

   inconsistent 
  with 
  the 
  following 
  passage 
  in 
  a 
  subsequent 
  work 
  of 
  Dr 
  Priestley 
  

   himself, 
  — 
  " 
  Whatever 
  ideas 
  are 
  in 
  themselves, 
  they 
  are 
  evidently 
  produced 
  by 
  

   external 
  objects, 
  and 
  must 
  therefore 
  correspond 
  to 
  them; 
  and 
  since 
  many 
  of 
  the 
  objects 
  

   or 
  archetypes 
  of 
  ideas 
  are 
  divisible, 
  it 
  necessarily 
  follows, 
  that 
  the 
  ideas 
  themselves 
  

   are 
  divisible 
  also. 
  The 
  idea 
  of 
  a 
  man, 
  for 
  instance, 
  could 
  in 
  no 
  sense 
  correspond 
  

   to 
  a 
  man, 
  which 
  is 
  the 
  archetype 
  of 
  it, 
  and 
  therefore 
  could 
  not 
  he 
  the 
  idea 
  of 
  a 
  man, 
  

   if 
  it 
  did 
  not 
  consist 
  of 
  the 
  ideas 
  of 
  his 
  head, 
  arms, 
  trunk, 
  legs, 
  &c. 
  It 
  therefore 
  

   consists 
  of 
  parts, 
  and 
  is 
  consequently 
  divisible. 
  And 
  how 
  is 
  it 
  possible 
  that 
  a 
  thing 
  

   (be 
  the 
  nature 
  of 
  it 
  what 
  it 
  may) 
  that 
  is 
  divisible, 
  should 
  be 
  contained 
  in 
  a 
  sub- 
  

   stance, 
  be 
  the 
  nature 
  of 
  it 
  likewise 
  what 
  it 
  may, 
  that 
  is 
  indivisible." 
  If 
  the 
  

   " 
  archetype 
  of 
  ideas 
  have 
  extension, 
  the 
  ideas 
  expressive 
  of 
  them 
  must 
  have 
  ex- 
  

   tension 
  likewise; 
  and 
  therefore 
  the 
  mind 
  in 
  which 
  they 
  exist, 
  whether 
  it 
  be 
  

   material 
  or 
  immaterial, 
  must 
  have 
  extension 
  also." 
  

  

  " 
  No 
  form 
  of 
  words," 
  says 
  Mr 
  Stewart, 
  " 
  could 
  have 
  conveyed 
  a 
  more 
  un- 
  

   qualified 
  sanction 
  than 
  he 
  has 
  here 
  given 
  to 
  the 
  old 
  hypothesis 
  concerning 
  Ideas, 
  

   — 
  a 
  hypothesis 
  which 
  he 
  had 
  before 
  asserted 
  to 
  have 
  been 
  never 
  considered 
  by 
  

   any 
  philosopher 
  but 
  as 
  a 
  figurative 
  mode 
  of 
  expression 
  ; 
  and 
  which, 
  when 
  viewed 
  

   in 
  the 
  light 
  of 
  a 
  theory, 
  he 
  had 
  represented 
  as 
  an 
  absurdity 
  too 
  palpable 
  to 
  deserve 
  

   a 
  serious 
  refutation." 
  — 
  {Phil. 
  Essays, 
  p. 
  554.) 
  

  

  Mr 
  Stewart 
  afterwards 
  refers, 
  in 
  the 
  same 
  work, 
  to 
  the 
  passages 
  which 
  I 
  

   shall 
  presently 
  quote 
  from 
  Dr 
  Reid, 
  as 
  containing 
  the 
  true 
  statement 
  of 
  his 
  reply 
  

   to 
  the 
  sceptical 
  argument 
  of 
  Berkeley 
  and 
  Hume 
  ; 
  founded, 
  as 
  he 
  believed 
  it 
  to 
  

   be, 
  on 
  the 
  language 
  of 
  Locke, 
  and 
  of 
  what 
  have 
  since 
  been 
  termed 
  the 
  Sensa- 
  

   tional 
  School 
  of 
  Metaphysicians 
  ; 
  and 
  farther 
  refers 
  to 
  several 
  prior 
  authors, 
  par- 
  

   ticularly 
  Baxter 
  in 
  this 
  country, 
  and 
  D'Alembert 
  in 
  France, 
  as 
  having 
  stated 
  

   and 
  pointed 
  out 
  the 
  importance 
  of 
  the 
  same 
  principle 
  that 
  Reid 
  did, 
  but 
  without 
  

   illustrating 
  it 
  sufficiently. 
  — 
  (See 
  Phil. 
  Essays, 
  Notes 
  and 
  Illustrations, 
  p. 
  55.) 
  

  

  I 
  cannot 
  conceive 
  that 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  should 
  have 
  made 
  the 
  statements 
  which 
  I 
  

   have 
  quoted, 
  and 
  which 
  Sir 
  James 
  Mackintosh 
  and 
  others 
  have 
  approved, 
  as 
  to 
  

  

  