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  PROFESSOR 
  ALISON 
  ON 
  THE 
  BELIEF 
  

  

  argument, 
  might 
  be 
  used 
  only 
  metaphorically, 
  as 
  asserted 
  by 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  ; 
  and 
  

   his 
  answer 
  to 
  the 
  argument 
  is 
  expressly 
  so 
  stated 
  as 
  to 
  be 
  equally 
  applicable, 
  

   whether 
  the 
  word 
  is 
  used 
  in 
  the 
  literal 
  or 
  the 
  metaphorical 
  sense. 
  His 
  main 
  argu- 
  

   ment 
  is 
  directed, 
  not 
  necessarily 
  against 
  the 
  supposition 
  of 
  intermediate 
  exist- 
  

   ences, 
  called 
  Ideas, 
  but 
  against 
  the 
  supposition 
  that 
  the 
  material 
  world, 
  if 
  it 
  

   exists, 
  must 
  be 
  the 
  express 
  image 
  or 
  representation 
  of 
  the 
  mental 
  acts 
  by 
  which 
  

   we 
  are 
  made 
  acquainted 
  with 
  it. 
  

  

  It 
  will 
  be 
  observed, 
  that 
  there 
  is 
  no 
  absurdity 
  in 
  saying 
  that 
  a 
  Sensation, 
  or 
  

   any 
  other 
  mental 
  act, 
  uniformly 
  attends 
  the 
  impression 
  on 
  any 
  of 
  our 
  organs, 
  

   made 
  by 
  any 
  particular 
  external 
  object 
  or 
  quality, 
  that 
  it 
  indicates 
  to 
  us 
  its 
  ex- 
  

   istence, 
  and 
  suggests 
  to 
  us, 
  or 
  enables 
  us 
  to 
  form, 
  a 
  notion 
  of 
  its 
  nature. 
  The 
  

   absurdity 
  lies 
  only 
  in 
  supposing, 
  that 
  any 
  mental 
  act 
  can 
  be 
  the 
  exact 
  image 
  or 
  

   representation 
  of 
  anything 
  but 
  another 
  mental 
  act, 
  in 
  the 
  same 
  or 
  another 
  mind 
  ; 
  

   and 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  was 
  at 
  pains 
  to 
  point 
  out 
  that 
  his 
  reply 
  to 
  this 
  is 
  independent 
  of 
  

   any 
  particular 
  meaning, 
  and 
  even 
  of 
  the 
  use, 
  of 
  the 
  word 
  Idea. 
  

  

  He 
  says, 
  — 
  ; 
  ' 
  To 
  prevent 
  mistakes, 
  the 
  reader 
  must 
  be 
  reminded, 
  that 
  if 
  by 
  

   Ideas 
  are 
  meant 
  only 
  the 
  acts 
  or 
  operations 
  of 
  our 
  minds 
  in 
  perceiving, 
  remem- 
  

   bering, 
  or 
  imagining 
  objects, 
  I 
  am 
  far 
  from 
  calling 
  in 
  question 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  

   those 
  acts 
  ; 
  we 
  are 
  conscious 
  of 
  them 
  every 
  hour 
  of 
  life, 
  and 
  I 
  believe 
  no 
  man 
  of 
  a 
  

   sound 
  mind 
  ever 
  doubted 
  of 
  their 
  existence." 
  — 
  {Intellectual 
  Poiuers, 
  p. 
  197.) 
  

  

  This 
  shews 
  that 
  he 
  was 
  aware 
  that 
  the 
  term 
  Ideas 
  might 
  be 
  used 
  metaphori- 
  

   cally, 
  " 
  or 
  as 
  illustrative 
  language" 
  for 
  acts 
  or 
  states 
  of 
  mind. 
  

  

  Then 
  he 
  says, 
  in 
  stating 
  his 
  argument 
  against 
  Bishop 
  Berkeley, 
  — 
  " 
  That 
  we 
  

   have 
  many 
  Sensations 
  by 
  means 
  of 
  our 
  external 
  senses, 
  there 
  can 
  be 
  no 
  doubt 
  • 
  

   and 
  ifhe 
  is 
  pleased 
  to 
  call 
  these 
  Ideas, 
  there 
  ought 
  to 
  be 
  no 
  dispute 
  about 
  the 
  

   meaning 
  of 
  a 
  word.*' 
  " 
  But," 
  says 
  Bishop 
  Berkeley, 
  " 
  by 
  our 
  senses 
  we 
  have 
  

   knowledge 
  only 
  of 
  our 
  Sensations 
  or 
  Ideas, 
  call 
  them 
  which 
  you 
  will 
  ; 
  and 
  these, 
  

   which 
  are 
  attributes 
  of 
  Mind, 
  can 
  have 
  no 
  resemblance 
  to 
  any 
  qualities 
  of 
  a 
  thing 
  

   which 
  is 
  inanimate. 
  / 
  allow 
  him 
  to 
  call 
  them 
  which 
  he 
  will, 
  but 
  I 
  would 
  have 
  the 
  

   word 
  only 
  in 
  this 
  sentence 
  to 
  be 
  well 
  weighed, 
  because 
  a 
  great 
  deal 
  depends 
  upon 
  it. 
  

   For 
  if 
  it 
  be 
  true 
  that 
  by 
  our 
  senses 
  we 
  have 
  the 
  knowledge 
  of 
  our 
  sensations 
  only, 
  

   then 
  his 
  system 
  must 
  be 
  admitted, 
  and 
  the 
  existence 
  of 
  a 
  material 
  world 
  must 
  be 
  

   given 
  up 
  as 
  a 
  dream." 
  — 
  {Collected 
  Works, 
  p. 
  290.) 
  

  

  Then 
  he 
  goes 
  on 
  to 
  give 
  the 
  proof, 
  that 
  the 
  mental 
  act 
  in 
  question, 
  however 
  

   rapid, 
  is 
  more 
  complex 
  than 
  it 
  had 
  been 
  represented, 
  — 
  that 
  our 
  minds 
  are 
  so 
  

   constituted 
  as 
  to 
  form 
  uniformly 
  certain 
  definite 
  notions 
  on 
  occasion 
  of 
  certain 
  sensa- 
  

   tions 
  being 
  excited 
  in 
  us, 
  — 
  to 
  draw 
  certain 
  inferences, 
  or 
  pass 
  certain 
  judgments, 
  as 
  

   to 
  the 
  existence 
  and 
  certain 
  qualities 
  of 
  things 
  external 
  to 
  ourselves, 
  — 
  that 
  it 
  is 
  

   to 
  these 
  perceptions 
  that 
  the 
  intuitive 
  belief 
  of 
  independent 
  existence 
  is 
  attached, 
  

   — 
  and 
  that 
  these 
  we 
  at 
  once 
  perceive, 
  when 
  our 
  attention 
  is 
  fixed 
  on 
  them, 
  to 
  be 
  es- 
  

   sentially 
  distinct 
  from 
  the 
  sensations, 
  and 
  to 
  resemble 
  them 
  in 
  no 
  particular. 
  This 
  per- 
  

  

  