﻿ATTENDING 
  THE 
  EXERCISE 
  OF 
  THE 
  SENSES. 
  529 
  

  

  ceived 
  or 
  felt 
  dissimilarity 
  of 
  the 
  Notions 
  or 
  Conceptions, 
  as 
  to 
  external 
  existences, 
  

   which 
  are 
  formed 
  in 
  the 
  mind, 
  from 
  the 
  Sensations 
  which 
  suggest 
  or 
  introduce 
  

   them 
  into 
  the 
  mind, 
  is 
  what 
  both 
  Reid 
  and 
  Stewart 
  relied 
  on, 
  as 
  the 
  answer 
  to 
  

   the 
  sceptical 
  argument 
  of 
  Hume 
  and 
  Berkeley 
  ; 
  and 
  is 
  not 
  once 
  noticed 
  either 
  by 
  

   Dr 
  Brown 
  or 
  Lord 
  Jeffrey. 
  

  

  This 
  argument 
  is 
  given 
  at 
  more 
  length 
  by 
  Reid 
  as 
  follows 
  : 
  — 
  " 
  It 
  is 
  true 
  we 
  

   bave 
  feelings 
  of 
  touch, 
  which 
  every 
  moment 
  present 
  the 
  notion 
  of 
  Extension 
  or 
  

   Space 
  to 
  the 
  mind 
  : 
  but 
  how 
  they 
  come 
  to 
  do 
  so 
  is 
  the 
  question 
  ; 
  for 
  those 
  feel- 
  

   ings 
  do 
  no 
  more 
  resemble 
  extension, 
  than 
  they 
  resemble 
  justice 
  or 
  courage 
  ; 
  nor 
  can 
  

   the 
  existence 
  of 
  extended 
  things 
  be 
  inferred 
  from 
  those 
  feelings, 
  by 
  any 
  rules 
  of 
  

   reasoning 
  ; 
  so 
  that 
  the 
  feelings 
  we 
  have 
  by 
  touch 
  can 
  neither 
  explain 
  how 
  we 
  get 
  

   the 
  notion, 
  nor 
  how 
  we 
  come 
  by 
  the 
  belief, 
  of 
  extended 
  things. 
  

  

  " 
  What 
  hath 
  imposed 
  upon 
  philosophers 
  in 
  this 
  matter 
  is, 
  that 
  the 
  feelings 
  of 
  

   touch, 
  which 
  suggest 
  primary 
  qualities, 
  have 
  no 
  names, 
  nor 
  are 
  they 
  ever 
  reflected 
  

   upon. 
  They 
  pass 
  through 
  the 
  mind 
  instantaneously, 
  and 
  serve 
  only 
  to 
  introduce 
  

   the 
  notion 
  and 
  belief 
  of 
  external 
  things 
  which, 
  by 
  our 
  constitution 
  are 
  connected 
  

   with 
  them. 
  They 
  are 
  natural 
  signs, 
  and 
  the 
  mind 
  immediately 
  passes 
  to 
  the 
  

   thing 
  signified, 
  without 
  making 
  the 
  least 
  reflection 
  upon 
  the 
  sign, 
  or 
  observing 
  

   that 
  there 
  was 
  any 
  such 
  thing.'' 
  

  

  " 
  Let 
  a 
  man 
  press 
  his 
  hand 
  against 
  the 
  table, 
  he 
  feels 
  it 
  hard. 
  But 
  what 
  is 
  the 
  

   meaning 
  of 
  this 
  ? 
  The 
  meaning 
  undoubtedly 
  is, 
  that 
  he 
  hath 
  a 
  certain 
  feeling 
  of 
  

   touch, 
  from 
  which 
  he 
  concludes, 
  without 
  any 
  reasoning, 
  or 
  comparing 
  ideas, 
  that 
  

   there 
  is 
  something 
  external 
  really 
  existing, 
  whose 
  parts 
  stick 
  so 
  firmly 
  together, 
  

   that 
  they 
  cannot 
  be 
  displaced 
  without 
  considerable 
  force. 
  

  

  " 
  There 
  is 
  here 
  a 
  feeling, 
  and 
  a 
  conclusion 
  drawn 
  from 
  it, 
  or 
  some 
  way 
  suggested 
  

   by 
  it. 
  The 
  hardness 
  of 
  the 
  table 
  is 
  the 
  conclusion, 
  the 
  feeling 
  is 
  the 
  medium 
  by 
  

   which 
  we 
  are 
  led 
  to 
  that 
  conclusion. 
  Let 
  a 
  man 
  attend 
  distinctly 
  to 
  this 
  medium 
  

   and 
  to 
  this 
  conclusion, 
  and 
  he 
  will 
  perceive 
  them 
  to 
  be 
  as 
  unlike 
  as 
  any 
  two 
  things 
  

   in 
  nature. 
  The 
  one 
  is 
  a 
  sensation 
  of 
  the 
  mind, 
  which 
  can 
  have 
  no 
  existence 
  but 
  

   in 
  a 
  sentient 
  being, 
  nor 
  can 
  it 
  exist 
  one 
  moment 
  longer 
  than 
  it 
  is 
  felt 
  ; 
  the 
  other 
  

   is 
  in 
  the 
  table, 
  and 
  we 
  conclude, 
  without 
  any 
  difficulty, 
  that 
  it 
  was 
  in 
  the 
  table 
  

   before 
  it 
  was 
  felt, 
  and 
  continues 
  there 
  after 
  the 
  feeling 
  is 
  over. 
  The 
  one 
  implies 
  no 
  

   kind 
  of 
  extension, 
  nor 
  parts, 
  nor 
  cohesion 
  ; 
  the 
  other 
  implies 
  all 
  these. 
  Both, 
  indeed, 
  

   admit 
  of 
  degrees, 
  and 
  the 
  feeling, 
  beyond 
  a 
  certain 
  degree, 
  is 
  a 
  species 
  of 
  pain, 
  but 
  

   adamantine 
  hardness 
  does 
  not 
  imply 
  the 
  least 
  pain." 
  — 
  {Collected 
  Works, 
  p. 
  125.) 
  

  

  The 
  substance 
  of 
  this 
  argument 
  is, 
  that 
  the 
  external 
  existences, 
  or 
  qualities 
  of 
  

   external 
  objects, 
  of 
  which 
  our 
  knowledge 
  is 
  acquired 
  by 
  the 
  senses, 
  are 
  not 
  felt 
  or 
  

   apprehended 
  by 
  us 
  as 
  prototypes 
  or 
  patterns 
  of 
  the 
  sensations, 
  through 
  which 
  

   they 
  are 
  made 
  known, 
  but 
  perceived 
  to 
  differ 
  from 
  them 
  in 
  every 
  particular 
  ; 
  as 
  in 
  

   the 
  case 
  of 
  the 
  notion 
  of 
  Extension 
  or 
  Space, 
  formerly 
  mentioned, 
  — 
  formed 
  during 
  

   the 
  exercise 
  of 
  various 
  senses, 
  i. 
  e., 
  in 
  consequence 
  of 
  the 
  excitement 
  of 
  various 
  

  

  VOL. 
  XX. 
  PART 
  IV. 
  7 
  D 
  

  

  