﻿530 
  PROFESSOR 
  ALISON 
  ON 
  THE 
  BELIEF 
  

  

  sensations, 
  but 
  which 
  is 
  no 
  sooner 
  apprehended 
  than 
  it 
  " 
  swells 
  in 
  the 
  human 
  

   mind 
  to 
  Infinit}'," 
  to 
  which 
  notion 
  certainly 
  no 
  human 
  sensation 
  can 
  bear 
  any 
  

   resemblance 
  ; 
  and 
  no 
  one 
  has 
  rightly 
  apprehended 
  the 
  argument, 
  or 
  can 
  be 
  aware 
  

   of 
  the 
  importance 
  ascribed 
  to 
  it 
  by 
  Mr 
  Stewart, 
  as 
  opposed 
  to 
  what 
  has 
  been 
  

   since 
  called 
  the 
  Sensational 
  School 
  of 
  Metaphysicians, 
  who 
  has 
  not 
  adverted 
  to 
  

   this 
  absolute 
  and 
  essential 
  dissimilarity 
  of 
  the 
  sensations, 
  from 
  what 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  calls 
  

   "the 
  Perceptions," 
  and 
  Dr 
  Brown, 
  the 
  " 
  Associations 
  and 
  Inferences," 
  consequent 
  

   on 
  those 
  sensations. 
  Those 
  who 
  do 
  advert 
  to 
  that 
  dissimilarity 
  must 
  perceive 
  

   that 
  our 
  conception 
  of, 
  and 
  belief 
  in, 
  the 
  external 
  and 
  independent 
  existence 
  of 
  

   space 
  and 
  matter, 
  — 
  although 
  a 
  mental 
  act, 
  and 
  a 
  complex 
  one, 
  and 
  involving 
  

   one 
  of 
  those 
  intuitive 
  judgments, 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  existence 
  and 
  authority 
  of 
  which 
  we 
  

   have 
  seen 
  that 
  Reid, 
  Stewart, 
  and 
  Brown, 
  are 
  fully 
  agreed, 
  — 
  is 
  perfectly 
  distinct 
  

   from 
  the 
  sensation 
  by 
  which 
  it 
  is 
  excited, 
  and 
  involves 
  no 
  such 
  absurdity 
  or 
  con- 
  

   tradiction 
  in 
  terms, 
  as 
  the 
  assertion 
  that 
  a 
  sensation 
  or 
  other 
  mental 
  act, 
  can 
  be 
  

   the 
  exact 
  image 
  and 
  representation 
  of 
  anything 
  that 
  is 
  not 
  mental 
  ; 
  and 
  therefore, 
  

   that 
  the 
  sceptical 
  argument 
  of 
  Berkeley 
  and 
  Hume, 
  founded 
  on 
  that 
  supposed 
  

   absurdity, 
  and 
  necessitating 
  our 
  departure, 
  as 
  Hume 
  expressed 
  it, 
  from 
  the 
  in- 
  

   stincts 
  of 
  nature, 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  evidence 
  of 
  the 
  senses, 
  falls 
  to 
  the 
  ground. 
  

  

  The 
  same 
  observation 
  applies 
  to 
  the 
  notice 
  of 
  this 
  subject 
  by 
  Morell, 
  in 
  his 
  

   review 
  of 
  the 
  Scottish 
  Philosophy, 
  who 
  says, 
  that 
  Dr 
  Reid 
  " 
  does 
  not 
  appear 
  to 
  

   him 
  to 
  have 
  dealt 
  a 
  complete 
  and 
  effective 
  blow 
  against 
  Hume's 
  argument 
  respect- 
  

   ing 
  the 
  material 
  world 
  ;" 
  because, 
  he 
  says, 
  " 
  the 
  sceptic 
  may 
  urge, 
  with 
  no 
  little 
  

   force, 
  that 
  although 
  we 
  must 
  admit 
  the 
  reality 
  of 
  our 
  own 
  personal 
  or 
  subjective 
  

   ideas 
  {i. 
  e-, 
  of 
  the 
  objects 
  of 
  consciousness), 
  yet 
  it 
  still 
  remains 
  to 
  be 
  proved, 
  that 
  

   our 
  perceptions, 
  however 
  clear, 
  and 
  our 
  beliefs, 
  however 
  strong 
  they 
  may 
  be, 
  in- 
  

   ternally, 
  have 
  reference 
  to 
  any 
  object 
  out 
  of, 
  and 
  distinct 
  from 
  ourselves." 
  Reid, 
  

   he 
  says, 
  deprived 
  himself 
  of 
  the 
  " 
  power 
  of 
  answering 
  this 
  final 
  argument, 
  by 
  

   maintaining 
  that 
  Perception 
  is 
  altogether 
  an 
  act 
  of 
  Mind. 
  So 
  long 
  as 
  perception 
  

   is 
  regarded 
  as 
  only 
  a 
  subjective 
  process 
  {i. 
  e., 
  an 
  act 
  of 
  mind 
  of 
  which 
  we 
  are 
  con- 
  

   scious), 
  and 
  an 
  idea 
  defined 
  to 
  be 
  the 
  act 
  of 
  the 
  mind 
  in 
  making 
  itself 
  acquainted 
  

   with 
  external 
  things, 
  we 
  are 
  unable 
  to 
  point 
  out 
  to 
  the 
  sceptic 
  what 
  he 
  demands, 
  

   viz., 
  a 
  clear 
  passage 
  from 
  this 
  subjective 
  activity 
  of 
  the 
  mind 
  to 
  the 
  outward 
  and 
  

   material 
  reality." 
  — 
  (Morel? 
  s 
  Philosophy, 
  vol. 
  i., 
  p. 
  287.) 
  

  

  Now, 
  if 
  this 
  author 
  had 
  rightly 
  comprehended 
  the 
  argument 
  of 
  Reid, 
  — 
  which 
  

   I 
  apprehend 
  he 
  must 
  have 
  known 
  only 
  from 
  the 
  account 
  of 
  the 
  controversy 
  given 
  

   by 
  Dr 
  Brown, 
  — 
  he 
  would 
  have 
  known 
  that 
  Reid 
  considered 
  the 
  clear 
  passage 
  from 
  

   the 
  act 
  of 
  Perception 
  in 
  the 
  mind 
  to 
  the 
  material 
  reality, 
  to 
  be 
  precisely 
  similar 
  to 
  

   the 
  passage 
  from 
  our 
  consciousness 
  of 
  to-day 
  to 
  our 
  recollections 
  of 
  yesterday 
  ; 
  i. 
  e., 
  

   to 
  rest 
  on 
  one 
  of 
  those 
  principles 
  of 
  Intuitive 
  belief, 
  the 
  existence 
  and 
  authority 
  of 
  

   which 
  are 
  admitted 
  by 
  himself 
  and 
  by 
  Brown, 
  as 
  well 
  as 
  by 
  Reid 
  ; 
  and 
  to 
  be 
  

   from 
  its 
  own 
  nature 
  incapable 
  of 
  any 
  other 
  proof. 
  

  

  