﻿ATTENDING 
  THE 
  EXERCISE 
  OF 
  THE 
  SENSES. 
  531 
  

  

  But 
  if 
  he 
  had 
  rightly 
  comprehended 
  the 
  argument 
  of 
  Hume 
  and 
  Berkeley, 
  he 
  

   would 
  have 
  known, 
  that 
  they 
  not 
  only 
  demanded 
  a 
  clear 
  passage 
  from 
  the 
  mind 
  

   to 
  the 
  material 
  object, 
  but 
  maintained 
  that 
  it 
  is 
  absurd 
  to 
  assert 
  that 
  any 
  such 
  

   passage 
  exists 
  ; 
  because, 
  as 
  we 
  have 
  seen, 
  they 
  said 
  that 
  by 
  our 
  senses 
  we 
  have 
  the 
  

   knowledge 
  only 
  of 
  our 
  Sensations 
  or 
  Ideas, 
  call 
  them 
  which 
  we 
  will, 
  and 
  nothing 
  

   can 
  possibly 
  resemble 
  a 
  sensation, 
  except 
  another 
  sensation 
  in 
  the 
  same 
  or 
  another 
  

   mind 
  ; 
  to 
  which 
  assertion 
  and 
  consequent 
  imputation 
  of 
  absurdity 
  it 
  was 
  that 
  Dr 
  

   Reid 
  opposed 
  the 
  fact 
  in 
  the 
  natural 
  history 
  of 
  the 
  mind, 
  that 
  by 
  our 
  senses 
  we 
  

   have 
  the 
  act 
  of 
  Perception 
  excited 
  in 
  our 
  minds, 
  involving, 
  as 
  all 
  admit, 
  an 
  intui- 
  

   tive 
  belief 
  ; 
  and 
  which, 
  particularly 
  in 
  the 
  case 
  of 
  the 
  primary 
  qualities 
  of 
  matter, 
  

   is 
  distinctly 
  felt 
  by 
  us 
  to 
  be 
  separate 
  from 
  the 
  sensation 
  by 
  which 
  it 
  is 
  excited, 
  

   and 
  utterly 
  incapable 
  of 
  comparison 
  with 
  it. 
  

  

  But 
  it 
  is 
  equally 
  obvious, 
  that 
  this 
  perception 
  and 
  belief, 
  being 
  regarded 
  as 
  an 
  

   ultimate 
  fact, 
  or 
  as 
  containing 
  in 
  itself 
  an 
  ultimate 
  fact 
  in 
  our 
  mental 
  constitution, 
  

   like 
  every 
  other 
  ultimate 
  fact, 
  physical 
  or 
  moral, 
  involves 
  a 
  mystery; 
  and 
  one 
  on 
  

   which 
  we 
  must 
  accustom 
  our 
  minds 
  to 
  dwell, 
  if 
  we 
  would 
  form 
  to 
  ourselves 
  any 
  

   clear 
  notions 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  constitution 
  of 
  the 
  human 
  mind, 
  or 
  its 
  connection 
  with 
  the 
  

   Divine 
  Mind. 
  It 
  is 
  only 
  by 
  a 
  kind 
  of 
  Instinct, 
  as 
  expressed 
  by 
  D'Alembert, 
  but 
  

   it 
  seems 
  better 
  to 
  use 
  the 
  term 
  Intuition, 
  — 
  "prior 
  to 
  Reason, 
  and 
  superior 
  to 
  reason, 
  

   — 
  that 
  the 
  human 
  mind 
  can 
  overleap 
  the 
  gulf 
  that 
  separates 
  the 
  visible 
  world, 
  

   from 
  the 
  percipient 
  soul." 
  

  

  I 
  have 
  already 
  shewn 
  that 
  by 
  the 
  admission 
  of 
  Dr 
  Brown 
  himself, 
  in 
  all 
  de- 
  

   partments 
  of 
  human 
  knowledge, 
  we 
  meet 
  with 
  such 
  ultimate 
  facts 
  and 
  principles 
  

   of 
  intuitive 
  belief, 
  any 
  farther 
  explanation 
  of 
  which 
  can 
  be 
  given 
  us 
  only 
  by 
  " 
  the 
  

   great 
  teacher, 
  Death 
  ;" 
  and 
  very 
  little 
  reflection 
  is 
  sufficient 
  to 
  shew 
  that 
  the 
  only 
  

   objects 
  which 
  we 
  can 
  propose 
  to 
  ourselves 
  in 
  any 
  inquiry 
  which 
  lies 
  on 
  the 
  con- 
  

   fines 
  of 
  Matter 
  and 
  Mind, 
  — 
  in 
  which 
  both 
  physical 
  changes 
  and 
  mental 
  acts 
  are 
  

   concerned, 
  — 
  are 
  to 
  ascertain 
  the 
  exact 
  phenomena 
  on 
  each 
  side 
  of 
  the 
  line 
  of 
  de- 
  

   marcation, 
  the 
  precise 
  conditions 
  under 
  which 
  they 
  take 
  place, 
  and 
  the 
  precise 
  

   laws 
  by 
  which 
  they 
  are 
  determined, 
  — 
  the 
  mode 
  of 
  union 
  being 
  beyond 
  our 
  com- 
  

   prehension. 
  But 
  so 
  restricting 
  our 
  objects 
  of 
  inquiry, 
  we 
  may 
  confidently 
  as- 
  

   sert, 
  that 
  enough 
  has 
  been 
  ascertained 
  in 
  regard 
  to 
  the 
  mental 
  operations 
  con- 
  

   sequent 
  on 
  the 
  impressions 
  on 
  our 
  senses, 
  as 
  well 
  as 
  to 
  their 
  physical 
  conditions, 
  

   to 
  form 
  an 
  important 
  body 
  of 
  science, 
  and 
  furnish 
  conclusions 
  of 
  the 
  highest 
  

   interest. 
  

  

  I 
  think 
  myself 
  justified 
  by 
  what 
  has 
  been 
  stated, 
  in 
  affirming 
  that 
  in 
  so 
  far 
  as 
  

   Dr 
  Brown 
  thought 
  he 
  had 
  detected 
  an 
  essential 
  error 
  in 
  the 
  reasonings 
  of 
  Dr 
  

   Reid 
  on 
  this 
  subject, 
  he 
  had 
  deceived 
  himself; 
  and 
  that 
  in 
  so 
  far 
  as 
  he 
  made 
  a 
  

   real 
  advance, 
  in 
  our 
  knowledge 
  of 
  the 
  manner 
  in 
  which 
  the 
  notion 
  of 
  the 
  primary 
  

   qualities 
  of 
  matter 
  is 
  formed 
  in 
  the 
  human 
  mind, 
  he 
  proceeded 
  strictly 
  in 
  accord- 
  

   ance 
  with 
  the 
  principles 
  of 
  Reid 
  and 
  Stewart; 
  and 
  therefore, 
  that 
  it 
  is 
  only 
  

  

  