﻿534 
  PROFESSOR 
  ALISON 
  ON 
  THE 
  BELIEF 
  

  

  since 
  the 
  time 
  of 
  Stewart 
  and 
  Brown, 
  either 
  in 
  the 
  mode 
  of 
  inquiry, 
  or 
  in 
  the 
  

   results 
  of 
  inquiry 
  on 
  the 
  subject. 
  But 
  all 
  that 
  I 
  wish 
  to 
  observe 
  on 
  that 
  point 
  is 
  

   this, 
  that 
  those 
  speculations 
  avowedly 
  relate 
  to 
  subjects 
  ulterior 
  to 
  those 
  on 
  

   which 
  Reid 
  and 
  Stewart 
  exerted 
  their 
  minds 
  ; 
  that 
  they 
  do 
  not 
  stand 
  opposed 
  to 
  

   the 
  doctrines 
  of 
  Reid 
  or 
  Stewart 
  as 
  to 
  the 
  exercise 
  of 
  the 
  senses, 
  and 
  the 
  mental 
  

   acts 
  thence 
  resulting, 
  but 
  are 
  regarded 
  as 
  an 
  addition 
  to 
  these 
  doctrines 
  ; 
  and 
  

   therefore, 
  that, 
  whether 
  admitted 
  or 
  rejected, 
  they 
  ought 
  not 
  to 
  interfere 
  with 
  our 
  

   appreciation 
  of 
  the 
  truth 
  or 
  importance 
  of 
  the 
  principles 
  regarding 
  our 
  mental 
  

   constitution, 
  which 
  they 
  had 
  laid 
  down, 
  and 
  which 
  these 
  authors 
  substantially 
  

   approve. 
  

  

  In 
  particular, 
  while 
  I 
  cannot 
  but 
  admire 
  the 
  sublimity 
  of 
  the 
  Theological 
  in- 
  

   ferences 
  which 
  Morell 
  has 
  stated 
  as 
  resulting 
  from 
  the 
  study 
  of 
  the 
  Mind 
  as 
  he 
  

   directs 
  it, 
  I 
  cannot 
  think 
  it 
  necessary 
  to 
  go 
  farther 
  into 
  the 
  subject 
  than 
  Reid 
  and 
  

   Stewart 
  had 
  done, 
  in 
  order 
  to 
  draw 
  from 
  it 
  inferences 
  as 
  satisfactory 
  to 
  the 
  in- 
  

   tellect, 
  and 
  as 
  consoling 
  to 
  the 
  heart 
  of 
  man, 
  as 
  can 
  be 
  drawn 
  from 
  any 
  unassisted 
  

   human 
  contemplation 
  or 
  reflection. 
  

  

  It 
  is 
  stated, 
  indeed, 
  by 
  Morell, 
  that 
  the 
  great 
  argument 
  of 
  Natural 
  Theology, 
  

   drawn 
  from 
  the 
  observed 
  adaptation 
  of 
  means 
  to 
  ends, 
  — 
  of 
  whichlmay 
  observe, 
  that 
  

   the 
  principle 
  of 
  the 
  adaptation 
  of 
  the 
  construction 
  of 
  animals 
  to 
  the 
  conditions 
  of 
  their 
  

   existence, 
  so 
  well 
  illustrated 
  since 
  their 
  time 
  by 
  Cuvier, 
  Owen, 
  and 
  their 
  follow- 
  

   ers, 
  is 
  distinctly 
  an 
  example, 
  — 
  has 
  been 
  well 
  set 
  forth 
  by 
  all 
  the 
  Scottish 
  School 
  

   of 
  Metaphysicians, 
  from 
  Reid 
  to 
  Chalmers 
  ; 
  but 
  that 
  two 
  subjects 
  connected 
  with 
  

   it 
  ought 
  to 
  have 
  been 
  taken 
  up 
  more 
  fully, 
  viz., 
  1st, 
  the 
  origin 
  of 
  the 
  idea 
  of 
  Ab- 
  

   solute 
  Power, 
  or 
  of 
  the 
  Divinity 
  in 
  the 
  mind 
  ; 
  and, 
  2d, 
  the 
  relation 
  of 
  the 
  Divine 
  

   Power, 
  or 
  Energy, 
  to 
  Man 
  on 
  the 
  one 
  hand, 
  and 
  to 
  Nature 
  on 
  the 
  other. 
  — 
  {Modern 
  

   Philosophy, 
  vol. 
  ii., 
  p. 
  71.) 
  The 
  first 
  of 
  these, 
  I 
  think, 
  may 
  really 
  be 
  regarded 
  as 
  

   a 
  defect 
  in 
  the 
  philosophy 
  of 
  Dr 
  Brown, 
  who 
  rested 
  the 
  great 
  argument 
  of 
  Na- 
  

   tural 
  Theology 
  exclusively 
  on 
  the 
  observed 
  adaptation 
  of 
  means 
  to 
  ends; 
  — 
  and 
  

   did 
  not 
  admit 
  as 
  a 
  part 
  of 
  that 
  argument, 
  the 
  formation 
  of 
  the 
  notion 
  of 
  Efficient 
  

   Cause, 
  as 
  distinguished 
  by 
  Reid 
  and 
  Stewart 
  from 
  Physical 
  Cause 
  ; 
  — 
  and 
  that 
  it 
  

   was 
  a 
  defect 
  seems 
  to 
  me 
  distinctly 
  shewn 
  by 
  an 
  observation 
  of 
  his 
  own, 
  which 
  

   I 
  cannot 
  reconcile 
  with 
  the 
  doctrine 
  which 
  he 
  had 
  laid 
  down 
  on 
  this 
  subject. 
  

  

  The 
  passage 
  to 
  which 
  I 
  allude 
  is 
  that 
  where 
  he 
  speculates, 
  with 
  his 
  usual 
  

   eloquence 
  and 
  fancy, 
  on 
  the 
  emotions 
  which 
  would 
  be 
  excited 
  in 
  the 
  human 
  race 
  

   if 
  it 
  were 
  possible 
  that 
  they 
  should 
  come 
  to 
  maturity 
  in 
  a 
  world 
  of 
  darkness, 
  and 
  

   the 
  sun 
  were 
  then 
  suddenly 
  to 
  arise 
  on 
  their 
  sight. 
  " 
  The 
  very 
  atheists 
  of 
  such 
  a 
  

   world," 
  he 
  says, 
  " 
  would 
  confess 
  that 
  there 
  is 
  a 
  Power 
  that 
  can 
  create." 
  Now 
  he 
  

   surely 
  could 
  not 
  have 
  maintained 
  that 
  this 
  instantaneous 
  inference 
  would 
  imply 
  a 
  

   process 
  of 
  reasoning, 
  by 
  which 
  the 
  supposed 
  atheists 
  might 
  satisfy 
  themselves 
  that 
  

   some 
  particular 
  object 
  was 
  in 
  view, 
  which 
  could 
  only 
  be 
  attained 
  by 
  an 
  influence 
  

   of 
  the 
  sun, 
  and 
  therefore 
  saw 
  in 
  this 
  sudden 
  and 
  striking 
  change 
  an 
  adaptation 
  of 
  

  

  