MR SMALL S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PROF. ADAM FERGUSON. 649 



and the principles of his progressive nature. Having laid this foundation of his 

 course in history, Ferguson proceeds in the second part of his work, to examine 

 the specific good incident to human nature, and to treat of moral law or the 

 distinction of good and evil, and its systematic applications, which are explained 

 under the heads of Ethics, Jurisprudence, and Politics. 



In the treatment of the metaphysical part of his course, Ferguson declares 

 himself an enemy to the scepticism of Hume, and opposed to the doctrine of ideas 

 as maintained by Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley, but he coincides in his views 

 with the metaphysical doctrines of Aristotle as revived by Reid. He is also a 

 valuable exponent of the inductive method of observation as applied to the mind, 

 so well laid down by Reid, and consistently recommends the employment of this 

 mode of procedure in all investigations. His metaphysical discussions are also 

 valuable, as showing clearly the characteristics of mental as distinguished from 

 material action, and establishing those primary truths on which all useful philo- 

 sophical speculation is founded. 



In his moral system, Ferguson was a philosopher of the Stoic school. He 

 avoided, however, the exaggerations and paradoxes into which many of its disciples 

 have fallen, and endeavoured, by selecting what seemed reasonable and just from 

 that and other theories of morals, to enunciate a more perfect system. 



In opposition to Hutcheson, who confounds the Will with Desire, Ferguson 

 first of all establishes Free-will as the subject and foundation of Moral Science. 

 To the laws which regulate the Will — viz., the Lam of Self-preservation — the Law 

 of Society — and the Law of Estimation or of Progression^ Ferguson refers all moral 

 facts, and all systems of morality. By this theory also he attempts to refute or 

 reconcile the different theories previously promulgated. 



In supporting his system, Ferguson was opposed to that of Clarke, who re- 

 garded the Intellectual principle as the arbiter of right and wrong, and who thus 

 made virtue a matter of mere calculation. He was opposed to Hume, who places 

 the foundation of morals in Utility, and shows, that if utility and virtue often 

 imite to urge us in the same direction, they are often also at variance and mutu- 

 ally contradictory ; and that whilst virtue is that which is most definitely useful, 

 and most certain to promote our happiness, it nevertheless is not confounded in 

 our minds with any idea of private interest. He was also opposed to Smith's 

 theory of Sympathy as the principle of morality ; and proves, that to sympathise 

 with a person, and to approve of his conduct, are two very different things. He 

 thus also disposes of Hutcheson's celebrated theory of the moral sense : — " If," 

 says he, " moral sense be no more than a figurative expression, by which to dis- 

 tinguish the discernment of right and wrong, admitting this to be an ultimate 

 fact in the constitution of our nature, it may appear nugatory to dispute about 

 words, or to require any other form of expression than is fit to point out the 

 fact in question." 



