566 PROFESSOR LORIMER ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 



whether happily or not I shall not stop to inquire, by justicia correctita or com- 

 mutativa, and justicia distributive 



The object of diorthotic or corrective justice, Aristotle explained to be to give 

 to each a perfectly fair, unbiassed, and, in this sense, equal opportunity of vindi- 

 cating whatever might be due to him, whether the amount might be greater or 

 smaller than that which was due to his neighbour. This was what we call 

 Equality before the Law ;" and justice demanded that equality, in this sense, 

 should be absolute. There was to be no distinction whatever of rich or poor, of 

 male or female, of old or young, of wise or foolish. 



The object of dianemetic justice, on the other hand, was to ascertain how much 

 was due to each, and to rank them accordingly. Here was still equality — perfect 

 equality — but it was equality which was no longer absolute, but relative ; it was 

 proportioned to the facts which the claimants respectively established, with 

 reference to the goods which they had acquired or inherited, or the powers and 

 faculties which God had given them, and which their own efforts and the circum- 

 stances of their lives had developed. So far all is clear. There can be no doubt 

 that this was what Aristotle meant, and as little doubt, I think, that he was 

 right.* 



As to the application of the doctrine there is great confusion in the text, as 

 we possess it now, and even Sir Alexander Grant has not made much of it. 

 What it seems to indicate is, that diorthotic justice, or absolute equality, is appli- 

 cable to private, and dianemetic justice, or relative equality, to public questions. 

 So read, it excludes democracy, which rests on diorthotic, and ignores dianemetic 

 justice altogether from the category of governments that are realisable in accord- 

 ance with justice ; and as this is known to have been Aristotle's opinion, it is an 

 interpretation which has satisfied most of his commentators, and I confess that 

 it satisfied me for many years. But I am persuaded now that this could not have 

 been Aristotle's meaning ; and if the text really amounts to this, it must be in 

 consequence of some blunder or other, which may very possibly have originated 

 with Eudemus. There cannot, I think, be the least doubt that both principles 

 come into play in every department of jurisprudence, and are called into action 

 in the decision of every case, from the most insignificant question of private 

 right to the most momentous question of international policy. And the method 

 of their action is this : the first principle, that of absolute equality, governs the 



* The best minds of the middle ages preserved a perfectly clear conception of the proportio. 

 " Jus," says Dante, "est realis et personalis hominis ad hominem proportio, quae servata servat 

 societatem, corrupta corrumpit ;" and Thomas Aquinas, " Materia justiciar est exterior operatio, 

 secundum quod ipsa, vel res qua per earn utimur, debitam proportionem habet ad alteram personam; 

 et ideo medium justicise consistet in quadam proportionis aequalitate rei extei'ioris ad personam exteri- 

 orem," Roder's Natur-recht, vol. i. p. 115. It would be interesting to inquire when the vulgar con- 

 ception of equality assumed the aspect of a speculative doctrine. It certainly is older than Hobbes, 

 and is traceable as far back, at anyrate, as to the attempts of the Jesuits to found a Theocracy by 

 levelling down all secular distinctions before the Church. 



