1879. | Instinct and Reason. a 99 
Some French writers and others do not separate impulse from 
instinct. This, Mr. Lewes opposes, since in instinct we see only 
one course of action often followed, when other sources as good 
may be at hand. This course of action is the result of accumu- 
lated experience inherited from the parents, But at the same 
time a change in the course is sometimes manifested, which would 
imply a slight degree of intelligence. From this it follows that 
reason differs from instinct but in degree rather than in kind, as 
instinct does from impulse. But as impulse denotes the sudden- 
ness of an act, and as an instinctive act follows so swiftly after 
the impulse or desire has once been formed, it becomes very difficult 
to separate the two. Roughly speaking then, instinct may be 
described as the directing force in simple habitual actions; while 
reason, in every case implies conscious memory, and may be 
viewed as the guiding and directing force in every act which is not 
habitual. Tt ts the putting in order of the proper apparatus to work 
in the best direction; or the proper selection of the best mode of 
acquiring wants. In instinct then we have no consciousness of 
action, but reflex acts performed automatically. Hence the com- 
mon error of applying intelligence only to the acts of man can- 
not be too much deprecated. Instinctive acts are as common 
among men as among the lower animals; and even in some 
species of plants, we note phenomena so wonderful as to cause 
some hesitation in classing them „entirely among instinctive acts. 
The theory of evolution aids us greatly in explaining many of 
the phenomena observed in the lower forms of life, perfectly 
inexplicable by any other mode of inquiry. From the simple and 
hardly exertive act of the monad to the complex and manifold 
_ actions of man, we cannot fail to perceive a constant progressive 
development, undeniable and indisputable. Each separate prin- 
ciple, if separate and distinct it be, overlaps another, there being 
no chasm, no break to evince the beginning of one and the end- 
ing of the other. The simple reflex act becomes compound; 
phenomena cease to be involuntary, and become conscious and 
intelligent. 
First Forms of Life—In regard to those transitional forms of 
life whose place in nature has not yet been determined, which 
multiply like the individual cells which make up animal and 
vegetable structures—by fissuration—little can be said — 
1 Principles of Psychology, Vol. i, p. 432 and foll. 
