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KIDD'S OWN JOURNAL. 



musicians, not to be able to give proofs of their 

 talent, because their instrument is in a bad state. 

 It is thus that the functions of the soul can duly 

 exercise themselves only when the organs of these 

 functions conform to the order of nature. But 

 these functions cease or are arrested, when the 

 organs cannot subserve the proper motions ; for 

 it is a peculiarity of the mind, that its faculties 

 cannot be duly exercised except by healthy organs.'''' 

 In another passage he says, that the soul begins 

 to exist at the same time as the body ; that it is 

 present, though it may not manifest itself ; just as 

 the form of the future man is contained in the seed ; 

 that the soul can only make itself known when the 

 successive development of the corporeal organs 

 permits it. 



If we do not take into consideration the differ- 

 ence which exists between the organs and the 

 faculties ; and if, to be a materialist it is sufficient 

 to declare that the exercise of the intellectual 

 faculties depends on the organisation, who is the 

 writer, ancient or modern, whom we have not the 

 right to charge with materialism ? 



Either wc must admit the whole body as the 

 instrument of the moral and intellectual forces, or 

 we must say that the brain is this instrument ; or, 

 finally, we must adopt several distinct instruments 

 in the brain. It is to these three propositions 

 that all opinions may be referred. Now it is evi- 

 dent that each of these propositions has, for its re- 

 sult, to make the intellectual qualities and moral 

 faculties depend on material conditions. 



In the first case, it is the body which we admit 

 as the necessary condition of the exercise of the 

 faculties of the soul. If this were materialism, it 

 is the Deity himself who would be the cause of our 

 error. Is it not God, (says Boerhaave,) who has 

 united the soul so closely to the body, that its 

 facult: s are defective when the organisation is 

 defec'i "^, and that they are disturbed when the 

 body is diseased ? Saturninus derives the differ- 

 ences in the moral and intellectual qualities of 

 man, from the different structure of his organs. 

 All the ancient moralists, Solomon, St. Paul, St. 

 Cyprian, St. Augustin, St. Ambrosius, St. Chry- 

 sostome, Eusebius, &c, regard the body as the 

 instrument of the soul, and plainly profess that 

 the soul always governs itself by the state of the 

 body. Philosophers, also, admit with Herder, 

 that all the faculties, even thought, depend on the 

 organisation and the health ; and that if man is the 

 most accomplished being of the terrestrial creation, 

 it is because the most perfect organic faculties 

 which we know, act in him by the most perfect 

 instruments of organisation, in which these faculties 

 are inherent. Lavater accuses those who, in this 

 matter, allow nothing to the primitive organisation 

 and formation, of insulting reason, and of defending 

 a system belied in every living being. 



In fine, from Hippocrates an 1 < ralen, physicians 

 and physiologists have all established the same 

 doctrine ; and whatever diversity there may be in 

 their opinions, the basis of all is the same. Some 

 make the moral character depend on the organs 

 of automatic life ; while others seek for the prin- 

 ciple of the passions in the numerous nervous plex- 

 uses and ganglia of the chest and abdomen. Others 

 explain the thoughts and desires by deriving them 

 from the liver. But, it is evident that one party, 

 as well as the other, subjects the faculties of the 



soul to material conditions ; and, consecpaently, 

 were this language sufficient to charge me with 

 materialism, the same charge would apply to all 

 physicians, all philosophers, and all the fathers of 

 the church. 



Shall we, then, reserve the charge of mate- 

 rialism for those, particularly,who regard the brain 

 as the organ of the soul ? This doctrine is not 

 less diffused than that of which we have just 

 spoken. We find it already in the sect of Pytha- 

 goras. The physiological physicians, and the 

 philosophers, make everything depend on the 

 brain ; at least, the qualities of the mind, attention, 

 memory, imagination, &c. Boerhaave and Van 

 Swieten attribute to the brain, not only the ideas, 

 their combinations, and the judgment ; but also 

 the moral character of man, and all his human 

 essence. Some among them maintain that the 

 impressions received, leave traces in the brain ; 

 they explain, by these traces, memory, the com- 

 parison of ideas, and judgment. Others, with 

 Malebranche, attribute to the firmness and softness, 

 the dryness and moisture of the cerebral fibres, the 

 difference of the faculties and propensities. Haller, 

 Buffon, and Bichat, regard the inequality of the 

 two cerebral hemispheres, as the cause of mental 

 alienation. Here, then, are so many opinions 

 tending to materialism. 



There are none, not even my adversaries, who 

 are not forced either to admit the brain to be the 

 organ of the soul, or to suppose a very subtle 

 material substance, to serve as a medium of com- 

 munication between the soul and the body. Such 

 is the case with Professors Ackermann, at Heidel- 

 berg, and Walter, at Berlin, whose objections 

 have been repeated by most of my opponents. 

 The first does not confine himself to regarding the 

 brain as the organ of the soul ; he also admits an 

 extremely subtle nervous medulla, soft and almost 

 fluid, which converts itself, by degrees, in the 

 cavities of the brain into animal vapor, and which 

 becomes a medium betwen the soul and the nerves 

 of sense. Walter says," in the infant, the brain 

 is like pap ; in old age it is hard, and in middle 

 life of an intermediate consistence. The brain 

 must have a certain degree of firmness and elas- 

 ticity, in order that the soul may exhibit itself in 

 its greatest brilliancy, and the man attain his 

 greatest mental perfection. This mode of viewing 

 the subject does not lead to materialism : it has no 

 other object than the reciprocal union of the soul 

 and the body." Thus, there is no writer who 

 does not make the moral and intellectual functions 

 depend on material conditions ; and my adversaries, 

 if I were a materialist, would be no less so than 

 myself. 



Finally, do my opponents think to impute ma- 

 terialism to me, because in place of one organ of 

 the soul I admit several ? But is one more or less 

 a materialist by admitting one or several organs ? 

 Is the organ immaterial because it is single ? 

 Whether the whole body or the whole brain be 

 the sole organ of the soul, the body and the brain 

 belong to matter. The admission of several organs 

 in the brain, makes no difference in that respect. 

 The hand is not less material than the five fingers ! 



It would seem that my adversaries must have 

 felt the want of vigor in their deductions ; for, in 

 order to save, at least in appearance, the simplicity 

 of their organ of the soul, they have been obliged 



