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297 



to imagine a central point, where the soul might 

 have its seat, and where it might perceive all ex- 

 ternal and internal impressions. " The organi- 

 sation," says Prof. Ackermann, "though divisible 

 into several oi-gans, yet offers one complete whole 

 in which all the organs depart from one point, and 

 in which they must all re-unite." But, unhappily, 

 he is obliged to concede that the anatomy of the 

 brain does not offer this principal point, where all 

 the nerves of sense unite, which transmit sensa- 

 tions to the organ of the soul. On the contrary, 

 I have proved in the anatomy of the brain, that 

 its different parts have their origin in different 

 points, and spread themselves in large nervous 

 expansions in places equally different. Van 

 JSwieten and Tiedemann have already remarked 

 that a general point of union, where impressions 

 of all sorts should arrive at once, would produce 

 only confusion. Yet Professor Ackermann thinks 

 that such a union of the divergent nerves would 

 be very possible, by means of an intermediate sub- 

 stance in which they should terminate ; and as, 

 according to his opinion, this might happen, he 

 concludes peremptorily that it is so. But to what 

 purpose this point of union ? This intermediate, 

 very subtle substance, must occupy a space at 

 least equal to that of the divergent nerves, or it 

 could not possibly come into contact with them ; 

 and supposing this point to be as small as an atom, 

 would it, therefore, be any the less material ? 



Supposing that the plurality of organs has no 

 existence in the manner that I shall show it to 

 exist in my second volume, all those who have re- 

 garded the whole body, or the brain alone, as the 

 organ of the soul, are not less liable than myself 

 to the charge of having admitted more than one 

 organ of the soul. It is in fact certain, and all 

 anatomists agree, that the total of animal life, and 

 consequently the brain, is double. This organ is 

 composed of two hemispheres, each of which com- 

 prehends the same parts. Thus we have all a 

 double organ of the soul ; and we should all be ma- 

 terialists, if it were sufficient, in order to be such, 

 to believe in the plurality of organs ; and in this 

 manner the Deity himself would have established 

 materialism in an incontestable manner. If I am 

 a materialist because I admit more than a single 

 faculty of the soul, and because I recognise several 

 primitive faculties, I ask if the ordinary division 

 of the faculties of the soul into understanding, will, 

 attention, memory, judgment, imagination, affec- 

 tions and passions, expresses only a single primi- 

 tive faculty ? If it be said that all these faculties 

 are only the modifications of a sole and single 

 faculty, who will prevent me from advancing the 

 same assertion of the faculties which I admit ? It 

 is very evident that we remark different properties 

 of the mind and soul in man. It must follow, 

 then, either that the soul is composed of different 

 faculties, or that a single and same soul produces 

 different phenomena by means of different organs. 

 Now, it is infinitely easier to imagine the unity of 

 the soul in the last case than in the first ; and, 

 consequently, materialism is no longer a bugbear 

 which ought to deter any one from my doctrine 

 any more than from others. 



Analogy, again, comes in support of this last 

 proposition. Every one allows that several wholly 

 different functions, which we feel obliged to at- 

 tribute to the soul, take place in us by means of 



different organs. The voluntary motions, for 

 instance, are executed by means of the nervous 

 systems of the vertebral column : the functions of 

 sense are each attached to a different internal and 

 external apparatus. 



It is true that men are not willing to admit the 

 comparison of the voluntary movements and the 

 functions of the senses with the moral qualities 

 and intellectual faculties, because these first 

 functions are regarded as material. But, as these 

 functions are performed with consciousness, and 

 in part voluntarily, this would imply that organs, 

 purely material, have consciousness and will. 

 This doctrine would approach much nearer to 

 materialism than mine. We should even find 

 ourselves obliged, after the example of a great 

 many philosophers, to include among the proper- 

 ties of manner, memory, intelligence, imagination, 

 the affections, passions, propensities and incli- 

 nations. What could prevent these materialists 

 from going one step further, and allowing to 

 matter other faculties — as the reason and the will, 

 which are called, by preference, faculties of the 

 soul and mind. 



The case is very different in my manner of 

 viewing the subject, and my doctrine is not open 

 to any of these objections. There exists, accord- 

 ing to my view, only one single principle, which 

 sees, feels, tastes, hears, and touches, which thinks 

 and wills. But, in order that this principle may 

 gain a consciousness of light and sound ; that it 

 may feel, taste, and touch ; that it may manifest 

 its different kinds of thoughts and propensities, it 

 has need of different material instruments, without 

 which the exercise of all these faculties would be 

 impossible. 



It results, then, from this discussion, that those 

 who charge me with materialism, because I regard 

 material conditions as indispensable to the exercise 

 of the faculties of the soul, confound these faculties 

 with the instruments by means of which they act. 

 It also results that, the brain being double, anato- 

 mists are forced to admit the plurality of these 

 material conditions : it finally results that the 

 profoundest writers of all ages have subjected the 

 exercise of the faculties of the soul and mind to 

 material organs ; and that, consequently, if this 

 truth establishes materialism, we must make this 

 charge against all the physicians and philosophers 

 that ever flourished, and even against the fathers 

 of the church and the apostles. 



PRIDE. 



A proud man is a fool in fermentation ; swelling 

 and boiling like a porridge pot. He sets his 

 feathers like an owl, to swell and seem bigger than 

 he is. He is troubled with an inflammation of 

 self-conceit, that renders him the man of pasteboard, 

 and a true buckram knight. He has given him- 

 self sympathetic love powder, that works upon him 

 to_ dotage, and transforms himself into his own 

 mistress — making most passionate court to his own 

 dear perfections, and worshipping his own image. 

 All the upper storeys are crammed with masses of 

 spongy substances, occupying much space ; as 

 feathers and cotton will stuff cushions better than 

 things of more compactness and proportion. 



