KIDD'S OWN JOURNAL. 



71 



a sentiment of morality, of justice, and injus- 

 tice, &c. 



One might almost be tempted to say, with 

 Lactantius, that except the religious sentiment, and 

 the knowledge of God, there is no moral quality, 

 and no intellectual faculty of which the animal 

 kingdom, as a whole, does not share at least the 

 first germs. Should it he thought that this com- 

 parison degrades man, I should answer with 

 Pascal, that if it be dangerous to show man too 

 much, in how many respects he resembles the 

 brutes, without pointing out his greatness, or to 

 let him see his greatness too much without his 

 baseness — it is still more dangerous to leave him 

 in ignorance of both. We shall not recognise 

 the less, in this work, the distinguished place 

 which the Author of nature has assigned to man ; 

 his real advantages are sufficiently conspicuous 

 to establish, of themselves, his superiority, with- 

 out having recourse to distinctions which expe- 

 rience and natural history disavow. The real 

 detractors of the human species are those, who 

 think they must deny the intelligence of animals, 

 to maintain the dignity of man. St. Gregory of 

 Nyssus, and St. Augustine, long since remarked 

 the necessity of comparing men with animals. 



I come, then, at length upon the question, 

 What is the origin of the instincts, mechanical 

 aptitudes, propensities, talents; in a word, the 

 moral qualities and intellectual faculties of man ? 



SECTION II. 



ON THE ORIGIN OP THE MECHANICAL APTI- 

 TUDES, INSTINCTS, PROPENSITIES, TALENTS; OP 

 THE MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES OP 

 MAN AND ANIMALS, IN GENERAL. 



It is impossible to treat with propriety of the 

 moral and intellectual faculties of man, without 

 having a just idea of their origin. Philosophers 

 have always regarded the following questions as 

 the most important to be treated of in the phi- 

 losophy of man. 



Is man born without determinate faculties, a ta- 

 bula rasa, a blank leaf, entirely indifferent? Does 

 he bring into the world with him the dispositions 

 which he manifests at a later period, or, does he 

 acquire his faculties only by his relations with the 

 external world? To what extent are the im- 

 pressions made on the senses, the source of his 

 sensations and ideas? What is the origin of 

 moral good and evil? Is man born entirely 

 good, or entirely wicked, or, with a mixture of 

 eontrary dispositions? Are all men endowed, to 

 the same degree, with the qualities essential to 

 their nature, or, are the differences observed in 

 this respect, due to the influence of accidental 

 causes posterior to birth ? Are these differences, 

 on the contrary, determined in the womb of the 

 mother ? And if they are innate, how are we to 

 cultivate, to perfect them, to repress or to direct 

 them, according to the demand of individual or 

 general good ? 



These questions, when they are resolved, will 

 infallibly lead to the knowledge of the true 

 sources of our propensities and our faculties, 

 and, consequently, the prime motives of our 

 actions. They therefore merit the most serious 

 attention on the part of religious and moral in- 



structors, judges, legislators, philosophers, and 

 physicians. 



The importance of those questions having been 

 generally recognised, it will be impossible to 

 avoid, in this work, the recurrence of some ideas 

 which are found insulated in other authors, such 

 as Bonnet, Georges Leroy, Keimarus, Herder, 

 Cabanis, &c. But, on this subject, so vast and 

 so worthy of our meditations, we have, as yet, 

 had only scanty materials; we have wanted suffi- 

 cient data; those which we seemed to have, were 

 too contradictory to deduce from them the sure 

 principles which should serve as the basis for a 

 complete and consistent doctrine. I shall support 

 each of my propositions with such a number of 

 positive facts, that they will not at all present 

 simple opinions, but will have the character of 

 remarkable truths, which, at all times, will be 

 able to stand the test of experience, and conse- 

 quently will be of permanent utility. 



The mechanical aptitudes, instincts, propensities, 

 talents in general, the moral qualities and in- 

 tellectual faculties of men and animals, are 

 innate. 



After having clearly indicated, in the pre- 

 ceding pages, the faculties which form the object 

 of my researches, the reader cannot any longer 

 confound what I understand by dispositions, and 

 by innate faculties, with the expressions, ideas, 

 innate notions, and innate principles. Thus it will 

 be superfluous to fatigue him with metaphysical 

 discussions of the hypotheses of Plato, Aristotle, 

 Pyrrho, Zeno, Descartes, Leibnitz, Malebranche, 

 Bacon, Locke, Condillac, Buffon, Helvetius, &c, 

 on the origin of the faculties of the soul and 

 mind, and on the origin of ideas. 



It will be seen also, that I am far from under- 

 standing with M. Laromiguiere, by dispositions 

 and innate faculties, a simple passive capacity, 

 such as that of a block of marble, which submits 

 itself to the caprice of the sculptor, according 

 as he wishes to make of it a Satyr or an Apollo. 

 I understand by innate dispositions, mechanical 

 aptitudes, determinate instincts and propen- 

 sities, determinate faculties and talents. I 

 understand, what I shall prove in the following 

 volumes, that each cerebral organ is impressed 

 with a determinate tendency; that each organ 

 enjoys an internal perception, a force, a faculty, 

 an impulse, a propensity, a feeling, peculiar to 

 itself. Here, there is no vague and uncertain 

 result either of an exterior influence, or of an 

 interior abstraction. As soon as the relative 

 organs have acquired their perfect development 

 and entire activity, the functions which result 

 are as determinate as the dispositions themselves, 

 of which these organs are the depositaries. 



" Do not believe," says M. Laromiguiere, 

 " that it is necessary to recognise and register as 

 many faculties or capacities, as we remark acts 

 or modifications of the human mind. In place 

 of enriching the science, this would be to anni- 

 hilate it. What would be thought of an ana- 

 tomist, who, having observed that the fibre of 

 the eyes which produces red, is not the fibre 

 which causes blue ; or, that the fibre of the ear 

 which gives one tone, is not that which gives a 

 different one, should see in this observation the 



