KIDD'S OWN JOURNAL. 



133 



and does love a kind master, dearly ; but his 

 own kindred have the sum of his affection. 

 His heart is ever thinking of them. Not so, 

 altogether, the black-cap; though he, too, 

 has his wandering thoughts towards father- 

 land, at certain seasons of the year. 



As regards externals, the personnel of the 

 black-cap exceeds in beauty that of the 

 nightingale. The latter is of a long inelegant 

 form, with a dusky breast, and a seedy-brown 

 colored coat. The black-cap, on the con- 

 trary, has a clear and grey- white breast, a 

 handsome bonnet noir, a keen intelligent eye, 

 and a crest for the most part erect. His tail 

 too, is trim, his feathers close, and his whole 

 form shorter and more compact. His legs, 

 which are slim, are of a blue-black cast, and 

 his claws always " neat." 



Nor is he ignorant of his personal attrac- 

 tions ; for he makes his toilet with consum- 

 mate taste and care, and shows himself off at 

 all times to the very best advantage — singing 

 all the while these domestic operations are 

 in progress. If you humor the little rogue 

 by noticing kindly these manoeuvres of his, 

 he will treat you to an impromptu of sur- 

 passing excellence, and you will find no 

 difficulty whatever in making a friend of him 

 for life. Try the experiment — and we shall 

 secure your good-will for the recommenda- 

 tion. 



PHRENOLOGY FOR THE MILLIOH. 



No. XX -PHYSIOLOGY OF THE BRAIN. 



BY F. J. GALL, M.D. 



{Continued from page 119.) 



As almost all Philosophers and Naturalists 

 have very greatly exaggerated the merit of the 

 sense of touch, I deem it necessary to dwell 

 upon it here. 



Of Sensation and Touch. 



In treating this subject, I regret to have more 

 to refute and correct, than to establish ; but the 

 surest means of approaching the truth, is to 

 remove errors and prejudices. 



Before speaking of the touch, properly so 

 called, I must say something of sensation in 

 general. It is certain that a great number of 

 erroneous opinions on the touch have arisen and 

 are maintained, solely because the difference has 

 never been accurately established between the 

 idea of perception, sensation, and that of touch, 

 tact. 



The faculty of awakemng perceptions or sen- 

 sation is common to the whole nervous system. 

 To perceive and to feel, are phenomena which we 

 observe first and most generally in all beings en- 

 dowed with the faculty of consciousness What- 

 ever alteration may have taken place in their 

 interior or exterior, becomes necessarily a sen- 

 sation, as soon as the animal has any conscious- 

 ness of it. To taste, feel, see, hear, and touch, 



are sensations; but we likewise feel pain and 

 pleasure, itching, tickling, weariness, &c, pro- 

 duced by internal causes; we feel hunger, thirst, 

 the calls of nature; we feel joy and sadness, 

 hatred and love, humility and pride, hope and 

 despair, desire, anguish, fear, terror, &c. : the 

 acts of our intellectual faculties, thinking, de- 

 siring, and wishing, are likewise sensations. 



It follows, that to feel or perceive, is a func- 

 tion common to all the particular functions of the 

 nervous system; it is properly and solely the 

 general sense, without which no being can be 

 conscious of his own existence, or the existence 

 of external objects. It is only in this accepta- 

 tion that it is said, with truth, that the origin of 

 all our knowledge is in sensation. But when, by 

 sensation, we understand only the impression of 

 the external world on the senses, as most authors 

 do, we neglect wholly the interior man and ani- 

 mals, and forget that the exterior world is known 

 only so far as our interior has the faculty of per- 

 ceiving it: and that, furthermore, this faculty is 

 an abundant source of numerous sensations and 

 ideas, by which each being preserves his individu- 

 ality, consciousness and peculiar nature, though 

 all are equally surrounded by the same objects. 

 Prochaska had already called the attention of 

 modern physiologists to the interior sensations. 

 Tracy more recently has done the same. Cabanis 

 has made one step further, by adopting instinc- 

 tive tendencies. Still, most of these authors have 

 remained behind on these subjects, as the fol- 

 lowing remarks on the sense of touch will prove. 



I have shown, in my Treatise on the Functions 

 of the Senses (see my large work, vol. i.), to 

 what extent the senses must produce the ideas of 

 external things. I have shown to what extent 

 the ear and the eye give an exact idea of space, 

 form, number, figure, and the position of a body : 

 I have demonstrated that the education or cul- 

 tivation of the touch answers no purpose ; that 

 the eye sees according to its proper laws, the re- 

 lations of objects which have just been enun- 

 ciated, and that it would be ridiculous to accuse 

 nature of having created senses, the functions of 

 which would be possible, only by the aid of 

 another sense entirely different. In this manner, 

 I have already greatly diminished the preroga- 

 tives which were formerly attributed to the 

 sense of touch. 



But I have not yet spoken of the opinions 

 which particularly concern this sense. Most 

 authors regard it as the sole mediator, director, 

 and reformer of the other senses. Without it, 

 say they, there would he no external world; for, 

 " as our perceptions," says Condillac, " are not 

 the qualities of objects themselves, but, on the 

 contrary, are only modifications of our soul; it 

 is consequently easy to conclude, that a man 

 limited to the sense of smell would have had 

 nothing but odor; to that of taste, flavor; to that 

 of hearing, only noise or sound; to sight, only 

 light and color. Then the greatest difficulty 

 would be, to imagine how we contract the habit 

 of referring to external nature the sensations 

 which exist only in ourselves. In fact, it seems 

 very astonishing that with senses, which expe- 

 rience nothing except in themselves, and which 

 have no means of realising external space, men 

 can refer their sensations to the objects which 



