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these same senses. Women for example, whose 

 skin, more delicate than that of man, gives them 

 greater acuteness in the sense of touch, have not 

 more genius than a Voltaire, &c. Homer and 

 Milton were blind at an early age; but what 

 imagination can be stronger and more brilliant? 

 Among those whose sense of hearing is most 

 acute, are any superior to S. Lambert, Saurin, 

 Nivernois? Those, whose senses of taste and 

 smell are the most exquisite, have they more 

 genius than Diderot, Rousseau, Marmontel, 

 Duel os, &c? In whatever manner we inquire 

 of experience, she always answers, that the 

 greater or less superiority of mind, is indepen- 

 dent of the greater or less perfection of the 

 organs of the senses." 



To prove still more amply that all our ideas 

 come from the senses, it is said, with Locke, that 

 the very expressions for the peculiar functions of 

 the understanding are borrowed from material 

 objects. " The words imagine, comprehend, 

 attach, conceive, instil, disgust, trouble, tran- 

 quillity, are all borrowed from the operations of 

 sensible things, and applied to certain modes of 

 thought." And with him it is asserted, that, in 

 all languages, the words employed to express 

 things not within the domain of sense, have de- 

 rived their first origin from similar ideas. In 

 this sense is continually repeated the maxim of 

 Aristotle, that nothing arrives at the mind without 

 having passed through the senses. 



I am, myself, convinced, that many expres- 

 sions which serve to designate internal acts, are 

 borrowed from the external world. But, if we 

 have established a comparison between two sen- 

 sations, does it follow that it was external im- 

 pressions which produced these similar internal 

 sensations? It seems to us, rather, that, in a 

 great number of cases, it is difficult to decide 

 whether a certain expression has first been in- 

 vented for an internal sensation, or for an 

 external impression; for man is alive to himself, 

 as early as he is to the external world, and 

 acquires sensations and ideas from within and 

 without at the same time. It was necessary to 

 designate the motion and rest of the eyes, of the 

 tongue, as well as the motion and rest of an 

 animal; the heart beats as well as a hammer; a 

 stone does not oppress us more than heavy un- 

 digested food weighs in the stomach ; the painful 

 feelings of distress, pricking, tearing, dragging, 

 and distortion, may affect us from within as 

 strongly as when they are the result of external 

 impressions. Who, then, will dare assert that 

 the expressions, strain, cold, warm, chill, pal- 

 pitation, trembling, &c, have been designed to 

 designate rather the qualities of external things, 

 than those of internal sensations? 



There exists in every language, a number of 

 expressions, which it would be difficult to derive 

 from material objects. Whence come the words 

 hunger, thirst, truth, falsehood, error, friend, 

 enemy, hatred, love, pride, honor, sin, evil, good, 

 vmh, think, joy, grief, fear, hope, &c? They 

 serve to revive our internal sensations, and we 

 employ them frequently to depict what passes in 

 the external world. We say that a country is 

 sad, that a house threatens to fall, that the exces- 

 sive heat does mischief to the trees, &c. 



Whence come the words which do not pre- | 



cisely designate determinate ideas, but simply 

 the mode of thinking; the prepositions, conjunc- 

 tions, interjections, adverbs of interrogation and 

 exclamation, &c, such as but, and, yet, notwith- 

 standing, for, if, nevertheless, consequently, also, 

 then, thus, alas, yes, no, &c. ? 



Do not the deaf and dumb, who possess 

 reason, but who are deprived of the faculty of 

 expressing themselves by articulate language, 

 depict their internal sensations by gestures, 

 which absolutely have nothing in common with 

 the external world? 



If all our ideas come from the senses, what 

 becomes of the general and purely intellectual 

 ideas, whose signification is wholly independent 

 of the material world? For example, " there is 

 no effect without a cause ;" " nothing can spring 

 from nothing;" " matter can neither be increased 

 nor diminished;" " a quality, contrary to a subject, 

 cannot belong to it ;" " a thing cannot exist and 

 not exist, at the same time." 



In fine, I have already shown in my large 

 work, in speaking of hearing, that the faculty 

 of finding analogies between impressions from 

 without and those from within, supposes a 

 faculty of a degree superior to that of articulating 

 words. Language, then, also proves, in all its 

 relations, that it is not solely the > work of the 

 impressions on the senses; but that it supposes an 

 internal and an external source of our sensations 

 and our ideas, and, at the same time, an intel- 

 lectual faculty much superior. 



Some authors, persuaded that the impressions 

 on the senses do not suffice to explain all the 

 faculties of animals and of man, admit an in- 

 ternal and an external source of our ideas, and 

 say, with Cabanis, Richer and, &c, that our ideas 

 come to us from two very distinct sources — to 

 wit, the external senses and the internal organs ; 

 that instinct arises from impressions received 

 from the internal organs, while reason is the 

 product of external sensations. They also add, 

 that "in animals, the grosser external senses 

 allow instinct to predominate, and that in man, 

 the perfection of the senses gives to the reason- 

 ing a marked preponderance, at the same time 

 that it weakens instinct." 



But this mode of expression again supposes 

 the error, that man has senses more perfect than 

 animals; and, as, on the other hand, we generally 

 attribute to savage nations the most delicate 

 senses — it would be from them that we ought to 

 expect the most profound philosophy and the 

 feeblest instinct; which will hardly be admitted. 

 But, we must first agree what instinct, properly 

 speaking, is. If, moved by different principles, 

 man is better able to govern his passions than 

 the animals, it does not at all follow that those 

 passions or instincts are more feeble. In fine, 

 the propensities, the inclinations, the passions, 

 are as much objects of consideration for reason, 

 as the impressions made on the senses; these, 

 also, have need of internal organs, when they do 

 not remain simple material impressions, and 

 must be employed by the understanding for 

 higher functions. The eye and the touch, alone, 

 no more form geometry, than the female creates 

 in the male the instinct of generation, or, than 

 the sheep is the cause of the carnivorous appetite 

 of the wolf. 



