34 IMPROVING NATURAL KNOWLEDGE 



bodied in what are called, by an unhappy metaphor, the 

 laws of Nature and to narrow the range and loosen 

 the force of men's belief in spontaneity, or in changes 

 other than such as arise out of that definite order itself. 

 Whether these ideas are well or ill founded is not 

 the question. No one can deny that they exist, and 

 have been the inevitable outgrowth of the improvement 

 of natural knowledge. And if so, it cannot be doubted 

 that they are changing the form of men's most cherished 

 and most important convictions. 



And as regards the second point the extent to which 

 the improvement of natural knowledge has remodelled 

 and altered what may be termed the intellectual_ethics^ 

 of men, what are among the moral convictions most 

 fondly held by barbarous and semi-barbarous people? 



They are the convictions that authority is the soundest 

 basis of belief; that merit attaches to a readiness to 

 believe; that the doubting disposition is a bad one, and 

 scepticism a sin; that when good authority has pro- 

 nounced what is to be believed, and faith has accepted 

 it, reason has no further duty. There are many excel- 

 lent persons who yet hold by these principles, and it is 

 not my present business, or intention, to discuss their 

 views. All I wish to bring clearly before your minds 

 is the unquestionable fact, that the improvement of 

 natural knowledge is effected by methods which directly 

 give the lie to all these convictions, and assume the 

 exact reverse of each to be true. 



The imprpygf of pafan^ taw1eHprp absolutely refuses 

 to acknowledge authority, as such. For him, scepticism 19 



19 It is scarcely necessary to point out that Huxley is not 

 here talking about scepticism in religion, but only about the 

 habit of doubt that leads to truth. The "golden rule" which 

 should guide one in this skepticism Huxley stated thus in his 



