IMPROVING NATURAL KNOWLEDGE 35 



is the highest of duties; blind faith the one unpardon- 

 able sin. And it cannot be otherwise, for every great 

 advance in natural knowledge has involved the absolute 

 rejection of authority, the cherishing of the keenest 

 scepticism, the annihilation of the spirit of blind faith; 

 and the most ardent votary of science holds his firmest 

 convictions, not because the men he most venerates hold 



address On Descartes' Discourse on Method (1870): "Give un- 

 qualified assent to no propositions but those the. truth oTwtiich 

 is~~so clear and distinct that it cannot be doubted/' And later 

 fie~dehned the scientific doubt thus: "Vvnen 1 say that Descartes 

 consecrated doubt, you must remember that it was that sort of 

 doubt which Goethe has called the active scepticism whose 

 whole aim is to conquer itself; and not that other sort which 

 is born of flippancy and ignorance, and whose aim is only to 

 perpetuate itself, as an excuse for idleness and indifference. But 

 it is impossible to define what is meant by scientfic doubt better 

 than in Descartes' own words. After describing the gradual prog- 

 ress of his negative criticism, he tells us: 



"For all that, I did not imitate the sceptics, who doubt only 

 for doubting's sake, and pretend to be always undecided; on the 

 contrary, my whole intention was to arrive at a certainty, and 

 to dig away the drift and the sand until I reached the rock or 

 the clay beneath.' " M ethods and Results, Collected Essays, 

 1:169. 



In the conclusion of the lay sermon, On the Physical Basis 

 of Life, 1868, Huxley had pointed that on subjects concerning 

 which we can know nothing certainly it is useless to speculate, 

 and then stated in a fine passage what he considered the duty of 

 man to be: "We live in a world which is full of misery and 

 ignorance, and the plain duty of each and all of us is to try to 

 make the little corner he can influence somewhat less miserable 

 and somewhat less ignorant than it was before he entered it. 

 To do this effectually it is necessary to be fully possessed of 

 only two beliefs: the first, that the order of Nature is ascertain - 

 able by our faculties to an extent which is practically unlimited; 

 the second, that our volition* counts for something as a condition 

 of the course of events. 



"Each of these beliefs can be verified experimentally, as often 

 as we like to try. Each, therefore, stands upon the strongest 

 foundation upon which any belief can rest, and forms one of our 

 highest truths." 



* Or, to speak more accurately, the physical state of which 

 volition is the expression. [1892. T. H. H.] Same, 163. 



