xxii INTRODUCTION 



deterministic than Jonathan Edwards's, but he himself 

 rejected the tu quoque argument. And at times he 

 expressed other ideas which, had they been definitely 

 connected with his idea of evolution, could have pro- 

 duced a conception of a growing world in which new 

 yet not uncaused events occur. On the side of de- 

 terminism he held that men are but "conscious auto- 

 mata, endowed with free will in the only intelligible 

 sense of that much-abused term inasmuch as in many 

 respects we are able to do as we like but none the 

 less parts of the great series of causes and events which, 

 in unbroken continuity, composes that which is, and has 

 been, and shall be the sum of existence." This is 

 of course not consistent with his belief in man's ability 

 to modify his environment and to realize even partly his 

 mofal ideals. But his explanation that the idea of neces- 

 sity has a "logical, and not a physical foundation" is 

 more hopeful. And his distinction between necessity and 

 law is quite in accord with his theory of truth: "Neces- 

 sary," he says, means "that of which we cannot conceive 

 the contrary," and "law" is "a rule which we have al- 

 ways found to hold good, and which we expect always 

 will hold good." On this basis he is justified in con- 

 demning the way in which the "notion of necessity" has 

 been "illegitimately thrust into the perfectly legitimate 

 conception of law" by changing "will into must." It is 

 unfortunate for Huxley's reputation as an ethical phil- 

 osopher that he did not hold more firmly to the ideas 

 thus briefly indicated, and develop them in connection 

 with his other ideas of human progress towards a moral 

 ideal. 



In spite of the gloomy view he took of both the im- 

 mediate and the ultimate result of human effort, so long 

 as both good and evil exist and any amelioration is 

 possible, Huxley repudiated pessimism as firmly as op- 



