128 SCIENCE AND CULTURE 



about culture has to do with an Institution, the object 

 of which is defined to be "to promote the prosperity of 

 the manufactures and the industry of the country." He 

 may suggest that what is wanted for this end is not 

 culture, nor even a purely scientific discipline, but simply 

 a knowledge of applied science. 



I often wish that this phrase, "applied science," had 

 never been invented. For it suggests that there is a 

 sort of scientific knowledge of direct practical use, which 

 can be studied apart from another sort of scientific 

 knowledge, which is of no practical utility, and which 

 is termed "pure science." But there is no more com- 

 plete fallacy than this. What people call applied science 

 is nothing but the application of pure science to par- 

 ticular classes of problems. It consists of deductions 

 from those general principles, established by reasoning 

 and observation, which constitute pure science. No one 

 can safely make these deductions until he has a firm 

 grasp of the principles; and he can obtain that grasp 

 only by personal experience of the operations of obser- 

 vation and of reasoning on which they are founded. 



Almost all the processes employed in the arts and 

 manufactures fall within the range either of physics or 

 of chemistry. In order to improve them, one must 

 thoroughly understand them; and no one has a chance 

 of really understanding them, unless he has obtained 

 that mastery of principles and that habit of dealing with 

 facts, which is given by long-continued and well-directed 

 purely scientific training in the physical and the chemical 

 laboratory. So that there really is no question as to 

 the necessity of purely scientific discipline, even if the 

 work of the College were limited by the narrowest in- 

 terpretation of its stated aims. 



And, as to the desirableness of a wider culture than 

 that yielded by science alone, it is to be recollected that 



