KANT. 99 



In the former, he considers all Nature under the 

 domain of natural causes, while in the latter, he 

 divides Nature into the 'inorganic' in which nat- 

 ural causes prevail, and the 'organic' in which the 

 active teleological principle prevails. There was, 

 therefore, in Kant's later work a cleft between 

 primeval matter and the domain of life ; for in tlie 

 latter he assumed the presence of final causes act- 

 ing for definite ends. As Haeckel says : — 



"After having quite correctly maintained the origin of organic 

 forms out of raw matter by mechanical laws (in the manner of 

 crystallization), as well as a gradual development of the different 

 species by descent from one common original parent, Kant adds, 

 'but he, the archaeologist of Nature, that is the paleontologist, 

 must for this end ascribe to the common mother, an organization 

 ordained purposely with a view to the needs of all her offspring, 

 otherwise the possibility of suitabihty of form in the products of 

 the animal and vegetable kingdoms cannot be conceived at all.' " 



Of course we cannot here follow out all the rea- 

 sons for Kant's change of view from his earlier to 

 his later years ; we simply see that he was staggered 

 by the impossibility of human investigation ever 

 reaching an explanation of the laws which have 

 governed the derivation of all organic beings, from 

 polyps to men ; he declared that this doctrine (of 

 Evolution) was compatible with the mechanical 

 conception of Nature, although no natural science 

 can attain it; it would therefore remain a daring 

 flight of reason. In a striking passage upon the 

 limits of our knowledge, he says : — 



