1890 SYMPOSIUM ON 'DESIGN IN NATUEE ' 263 



deductions amount to is an argument that there is 

 nothing in the constitution of nature inimical to the 

 hypothesis of design : beyond this they do not yield 

 any independent verification of that hypothesis. In- 

 numerable, indeed, are the evidences of design in 

 nature if once a designer be supposed ; but, apart 

 from any such antecedent supposition, we are without 

 any means of gauging the validity of such evidence 

 as is presented. And the reason of this is, that we 

 are without any means of ascertaining what it is that 

 lies behind, and is itself the cause of, the uniformity 

 of nature. In other words, we do not know, and can- 

 not discover, what is the nature of natural causation. 

 Nevertheless, I think it is a distinct gain, both to 

 the philosophy and the theology of our age, that 

 science has reduced the great and old-standing 

 question of Design in Nature to this comparatively 

 narrow issue. Therefore, I have directed the purpose 

 of this paper to showing that, in view of the issue to 

 which science has reduced this question, it cannot be 

 answered on the lower plane of argument which Mr. 

 Alexander has chosen. All that has been effected 

 by our recent discovery of a particular case of caus- 

 ality in the selection principle is to throw back the 

 question of design, in all the still outstanding pro- 

 vinces of Nature, to the question — What is the 

 nature of natural causation ? Or, again, to quote 

 Mr. Aubrey Moore, ' Darwinism has conferred upon 

 philosophy and religion an inestimable benefit by 

 showing us that we must choose between two alter- 

 natives : either God is everywhere present in Nature, 

 or He is nowhere.' This, I apprehend, puts the issue 



