KIDD’S OWN JOURNAL. 
105 

sensation, a propensity, a succession of ideas ; and, 
inthis respect, he has no empire over himself, 
except so far as he might prevent or produce the 
action of the organs. As it is impossible for him 
not to feel hunger when his stomach acts in a 
certain manner, so it is impossible for him not to 
feel the desires of the flesh, or any other propen- 
sity whatever, for good or for evil, when the 
organs of these propensities are in a state of ex- 
citement. Jt would, therefore, be unjust to render 
man responsible for the existence of these sensa- 
tions and desires; and for him to make of them a 
personal merit or demerit. 
But we must be cautious ; for it is a great mis- 
take to confound propensities and desires with 
will. To will, is nothing less than to feel desires, as 
M. Richerand quotes wth approbation from M. de 
Tracy, or as Fichté says, the simple tendency of 
the faculties to act; and desire is nothing less 
than a movement of the will towards a good which 
one does not possess, as it is defined in the Dic- 
tionary of the French Academy. 
The ancients spoke of desires, concupiscences, 
volitions, or inclinations, and distinguished them 
carefully from will. Kant has with reason followed 
them, and Condillac says, on this subject, with 
much justice, ‘‘ As it does not depend on vs, not 
to have the wants which are the result of our con- 
formation, it no more depends on us not to be 
inclined to do that to which we are determined by 
these wants.” 
It is then, also, from having confounded these 
various affections, desires, concupiscences, inclina- 
tions, with true will, that men have found inex- 
tricable difficulties relative to moral liberty. There 
is reason to deny freedom, as respects the existence 
of the desire ; but it is a false inference to conclude 
that the will and the acts are equally wanting in 
freedom. The desires, the propensities, are the 
result of the action of a single organ; as I have 
shown in treating of the origin of moral qualities 
and intellectual faculties. Will, on the contrary, 
is a decision, a determination, produced by the 
examination and comparison of several motives. 
Let us examine how man becomes capable of 
will, and, consequently, of moral liberty ; how man 
can be in opposition with his desires; and how 
this same will, this same freedom, acquires, in 
different individuals, a different extent. 
Let us represent to ourselves a being, endowed 
with a single organ. This being could perceive 
only asingle species of sensations or ideas, and 
would be capable of exercising only a single species 
of faculties. Such a single organ might well be 
put in action by internal and external irritations, 
and be exercised in this action by frequent repeti- 
tions. But this individual would not be suscep- 
tible of any other sensation or idea. It would be 
impossible for him to compare sensations and ideas 
of different kinds, and to choose between them. 
Consequently, as soon as the single organ should 
be put in action, there would be no reason why 
the animal should not follow the propensity put in 
motion, or the idea awakened by this action; he 
would, therefore, be under absolute restraint ; or, 
rather, he would have no possibility to do otherwise 
than submit himself to this motive, to this single 
impulse. The inaction or action of this being, 
would result simply from the activity or inactivity 
of this single faculty. It is thus that the inferior 
> 
animals are invariably limited to their aptitudes or 
their instincts. | 
As soon as animals are endowed with several 
organs (as happens especially in the more perfect 
orders), they also become susceptible of different 
species of sensations and ideas. It is true that, 
in this case, the action of one organ destroys 
neither the existence nor the action of another ; 
consequently, it can no more destroy the sen- 
sations and ideas excited by this organ. But an 
organ may act with more energy, and furnish a 
more powerful motive. The instant you have 
presented food to a hungry dog, and when he is 
on the point of devouring it, make a hare pass 
before him, and he will run after the hare, though 
he has not ceased to feel the sensation of hunger. 
If you repeatedly employ violence to prevent the 
dog from pursuing the hare, he remembers the 
blows which await him; and, though the ardor 
of his desire occasions him tremors and palpita- 
tions, he will no more trust himself in the pursuit. 
If the dog were only susceptible of hunger, or if 
he had propensity and faculty only for the chase, 
this mode of action would be impossible to him. 
It is then the plurality of organs which renders 
him susceptible of different ideas and sensations. 
But, as these ideas and these motives are not of 
a high order, we cannot call this faculty in animals, 
a moral freedom—a real faculty of willing; we 
must regard it as simple spontaneity, or the faculty 
of being determined by the strongest and most 
numerous excitements. 
Now let us compare man to the most perfect 
animals. How are the motives, of which his more 
elevated organisation has made him susceptible, 
ennobled and multiplied ? Beside the propensities 
and the faculties which he has in common with 
animals, he distinguishes truth from error, justice 
from injustice ; he compares the present with the 
past, and reads the future ; he seeks and discovers 
the connection of causes and effects; he has the 
sense of shame and decency; he has sympathy 
and compassion, and can of himself discover the 
duties which he owes to others; he is furnished 
with internal organs for morality and religion, for 
knowing and honoring an eternal and independent 
Being. His internal organisation, his language, 
tradition, education, &c., secure to him an abun- 
dant source of knowledge; and furnish him an 
infinitely larger number of motives than animals 
can have. By means of his reason, he compares 
ideas and sensations, weighs their respective 
value, and can especially fix his attention on 
determinate motives. From all these operations, 
finally, results decision. It is this decision, the 
result of reason, and of the comparison of motives, 
which is properly willing; and the act of willing, 
in opposition to the propensities, desires, volitions, 
the inclinations, and the simple sensation of con- 
tentment. 
It is now easy to conceive, how man may have 
desires and inclinations altogether different from 
will, and how his reason places him in oppo- 
sition to his desires. The senses are inflamed, 
and man feels himself incited to obey this move- 
ment ; but if he abandons himself to his desire of 
vengeance, he knows, by means of his intellectual 
faculties, that a base action will dishonor him, 
and that he will be rather regarded as the slave 
of his passions than as master of himself. If he 
