


106 
throws himself into the arms of voluptuousness, 
the frightful image of his health destroyed, and 
his domestic felicity overthrown, presents itself to 
his eyes ; the regulations of social life, the shame 
of abusing confidence, the disastrous results of his 
conduct as affecting the beloved object, &c. &c. ; 
all these motives act in his mind, and by their 
force or their number succeed in overcoming him. 
It is thus that a man comes to will a thing pre- 
cisely the reverse of that to which his desires would 
have led him. 
Each one then ought to feel that, so long as 
the propensities and the desires are not awakened | 
and nourished by the participation of the indi- 
vidual, he cannot be made responsible for them; 
but that he is so for his determination, for his will 
and actions. Thus it is, and always will be true, 
that the organs of the moral faculties given by the 
Creator, are the principle of what we call some- 
times propensity, sometimes inclination, desire, or 
passion ; according to the different energy of action 
of these organs. Every one allows that, in this 
respect, the empire of man is limited; it is not in 
his power to annihilate his propensities, nor to 
give himself inclinations at will. But, in the 
midst of the most earnest desires of man, if several 
faculties of a superior order, the exercise of which 
is maintained by a perfect organisation, act in 
him, and join themselves to the external motives 
which education, the laws, religion, &c., furnish 
him—these same desires are overcome. The will 
which man then manifests, is no longer the action 
of a single organ. 
It is the business of the man, secured within 
and without by multiplied motives, and endowed 
with the faculty of comparing them, to weigh 
them, and to be determined, or to determine him- 
self, according to these motives. Now it is incon- 
testable, that, so long as man enjoys his good 
sense, he can act thus ; and that he often wills and 
does the entire contrary of what his propensities 
direct him. Consequently, he ismorally free. It 
is this liberty which makes of man a moral being, 
which gives to his actions morality and responsi- 
bility. 
But, let us not believe that this faculty of 
willing or not willing, this moral liberty, has been 
given up to chance by the Creator. The deter- 
mination which takes place by motives, is also 
submitted to laws in such a manner that, in the 
exercise of moral liberty, there can never be any 
question as to unlimited or absolute liberty. The 
laws of nature, for instance, ordain that the facul.. 
ties of an inferior order should obey those of a 
superior order ; that every living creature should 
love himself, and, consequently, employ all his 
means and his faculties for his own happiness. 
“All men,” says Pascal, “desire to be happy. 
This is so without exception. The will makes no 
effort except toward this object. It is the motive 
of all the actions of all men, even of those who 
destroy themselves.” Man must, then, necessarily 
desire a good, and dread an evil, which he ac- 
knowledges as such. If several motives present 
themselves, it is notin the power of the man to 
decide indifferently for one or the other; but he is 
determined, according to the laws of thought, by 
the motive which acts most powerfully upon him, 
or offers him the greatest good. Without this 
necessity, man, with all his moral liberty, would 



KIDD’S OWN JOURNAL. 
faliinto that unreasonable contradiction against 
the laws of nature, of which I have made mention 
in speaking of unlimited and absolute liberty. 
Meanwhile, this liberty, comformable io the 
dependence in which we are placed in the’creation, 
to the laws of nature and of our organisation, 
fulfils all the conditions which we can expect from 
a finite, but reasonable being. It not only renders 
those who direct man, responsible, but makes 
each individual so, for his actions ; it is the only 
liberty which can be useful in life, and, as Locke 
says, the only one which is supposed in human 
institutions; while, in admittimg an unlimited or 
absolute liberty, all the efforts which tend to guide 
man, would be absurd. 
When certain philosophers require that we 
should practise virtue and justice, without any 
motive, for the sake of virtue only,—far from 
doing away with the necessity of motives, they 
present to you virtue and justice as the most 
sublime motives, and the most worthy to lead you 
to act. Every thing then proves, that in all 
states of human society, men have supposed no 
other freedom than that of being able to be deter- 
mined, or to determine one’s self, by the most 
powerful motives. 
It is certain, that all individuals do not enjoy 
a freedom to the same extent. How happens 
this : 
We have seen that the faculty of appreciating 
motives of a superior order constitutes the first 
condition of moral freedom. Now, all motives are 
founded either in our own constitution, on a happy 
organisation, or on external circumstances. As 
our internal faculties are more limited, the fewer 
motives will they furnish us to do good, or to 
avoid evil; and the more the noble sentiments 
and faculties predominate over the propensities, 
the more will these be counterbalanced when 
their tendency becomes prejudicial. Thus, the 
man with great talents has more liberty than the 
ordinary man ; and the more the faculties descend 
towards idiocy, the more also moral liberty goes 
on decreasing. 
The second source of our motives is in external 
circumstances. The man who has fewest wants, 
will also be less tempted than the man who is 
sunk in misery. The man formed and cultivated 
by education, morality, and religion, and who 
understands the laws and the duties of society, 
will have infinitely more motives in his power 
than he whose heart and mind have been aban- 
doned to ignorance and brutality. In general, 
the greater disproportion there is between the 
motives, whether internal or external, and the 
energy of the propensities, the more precarious 
becomes the exercise of moral liberty. 
SELFISHNESS AND BRUTALITY. 

How very revolting it is, to behold how the 
love for ‘Number One” prevails just at this 
particular time! And how very abominably ex- 
clusive ‘“‘some people” are! 
Even the sight of a playful child on the sands 
by the sea-shore, we observe, gives ‘‘ some people” 
annoyance; and they gaze on the “happy inno- 
cent” with contempt as they sweep rustling past it. 
The human heart has become ossified. What has 
not * Fashion ” got to answer for? 

