

BERGSON S PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM. 9 



enough so long as we think only to act on inert matter. 

 But in seeking to probe into the nature and origin of life 

 we have to seek also for something which corresponds to 

 so much of the absolute as cannot be conceptualised, that 

 is something which cannot be described in terms of space 

 and matter and energy, the only terms with which the 

 intellect deals. 



The argument then is that our concept of mechanism 

 is only that of the manner in which the intelligent acting 

 of man cuts up the universe and it does not necessarily 

 afford a complete description of nature. If then we find 

 that pure mechanism, that is to say, the concepts of 

 physical science, fail to describe the phenomena of the 

 organism we feel obliged to search for a new conception 

 of life. It would not be enough merely to say that we 

 are ignorant, and hope for the further development of 

 physics, and the application of the results so obtained 

 to the study of the organism. We see that intellect 

 itself, which is the same thing as mechanism, is only 

 a part of the evolutionary process. 



Let us assume, then, that matter and energy are all, 

 and let us attempt to describe the organism in terms of 

 those notions, seeing if our description and that of 

 physical science agree. Now science, so far as it is 

 quantitative and deals with equations and inequalities, 

 is based on the two laws or principles of thermo- 

 dynamics, and it may be regarded as a test of the 

 validity of a physical result that it should conform to 

 those laws. The first law is that of the conservation of 

 energy, and this states that the sum of energy which is 

 contained in a system isolated from all others remains 

 constant. If it becomes accumulated in one part of the 

 system it must necessarily be reduced by a corresponding 

 amount in some other part. 



