24 TRANSACTIONS LIVERPOOL BIOLOGICAL SOCIETY. 



implied in the possession of bodily organs structurally 

 adapted to act on things. We must regard it as not 

 necessarily accompanied by that which we recognise in 

 ourselves as consciousness. 



Intellect, on the other hand, we must regard as the 

 evolution of something essentially different, the inborn 

 knowledge of relations which we call the " categories of 

 thought." We inherit these ideas of substance, space, 

 causality, etc., and in virtue of them know the relations 

 between things rather than the things themselves. It is 

 true that we also possess an intuitive knowledge of 

 things, but this we share in common with the lower 

 animals, though perhaps to a less extent. Our knowledge 

 of the relations of things, that is of natural law, enables 

 us to cause things to act on each other ; in the end it has 

 enabled us to use tools. The perfect adaptability of the 

 bodily tool to the purpose for which it evolved we replace 

 by the imperfect adaptability of the artificial tool — the 

 difference is that between the flight of the bird and that 

 of an aeroplane. In the former case the bodily tool is a 

 perfectly but a specifically acting one, in the latter case 

 the tool is at first clumsy and imperfect. But in its 

 construction perception, that is the association of 

 intellectual processes with sense-impressions, arises and 

 with this our peculiar intellectual consciousness, that is, 

 our conceptual knowledge of the universe. 



We cannot fail to see that what we recognise in 

 ourselves as perception also exists, to some extent, in 

 the lower animal acting for the most part instinctively. 

 But just as all our knowledge of morphology demonstrates 

 that clearly-cut distinctions of form do not exist, however 

 much our classifications suggest them, so we have to 

 recognise that intelligence and instinct always co-exist 

 in the animal. Whatever cleavages have occurred in the 



