1881.] Reason—A Psychological Distinction. 789 
It thus appears that Alpheus heterochelis hatches in a stage 
more advanced than the first larval stage of the lobster. Unfor- 
tunately the specimens,.though carefully preserved for several 
years, finally got misplaced, so that it is not possible for us to 
give a more detailed description of the young at the time of 
birth. 
:0: 
REASON—A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTINCTION, 
BY HARLEY BARNES. 
fees its peculiar sphere, psychology requires a very close 
and rigid discrimination in the use of words. A prevalent 
looseness in this respect is a prolific source of confusion and mis- 
understanding in the discussion of this and similar questions. 
An article in the August Naturatist, entitled “ The Reasoning 
Faculty of Animals,’ contains a number of interesting facts 
showing that the lower animals have the power of “ reason ;” this 
term is defined as “the power by means of which one proposi- 
tion is deduced from another, and of forming a conclusion from 
known premises,” This is truly the faculty of reasoning—a part 
of the understanding—but reason, as understood by psycholo- 
gists, comprehends far more than this. The classification used 
in the editorial on insanity in the same number, and now gener- 
ally accepted, I believe, places all mental operations in three 
great classes : the intellect, the emotions and the will. Continu- 
ing this division according to Hickok and others, we have the 
Powers of the intellect arranged in three very distinct groups, 
called the sense, the understanding and the reason. A few words 
of explanation will make the arrangement plain. 
Sense is the name given to that operation of the intellect which 
forces a constant flow of perceptions upon the field of conscious- 
ness. These may be perceptions of the five (or six) senses, inter- 
nal perceptions of our own feelings and emotions, or the vague 
creations of a wandering judgmentless fancy common to chil- 
dren, savages, inebriates and opium-eaters. All these perceptions 
Ay in an unconnected, unceasing train across the mirror of con- 
sclousness, and are as momentary as the beating of sound-waves 
against the tympanum. This gives occasion for the second oper- 
ation of the intellect, called the understanding, by which these 
‘€parate perceptions are placed in their proper relation to each 
