848 The American Naturalist. [October, 
The fact that the papers on “ Hypnotism” were fewer than in earlier 
congresses, in proportion to the entire number, and that there were a 
bare half-dozen on thought-transference and telepathy, shows the gen- 
eral tendency of psychology. The hypnotic period is past, even in 
France. Not that the gain from the study of hypnotism has not been 
permanent and great; on the contrary, its results are only now getting 
so absorbed into the body of psychological truth that it no longer makes 
sensational appeals for a hearing. As to telepathy, I think there is a 
real decay of interest in the subject, much as this is to be deplored. 
The most interesting paper in the hypnotic field was a general one by 
Prof. Pierre Janet. 
The section on the Senses and Psychophysics did much exact work. 
Dr. Stratton of the University of California communicated some valua- 
ble experiments of his own on the artificial reinverting of the retinal 
image and its effects on the sense of bodily position in space, which will 
be of especial interest to those who think the normal inversion of the 
image requires a theory. 
Two other general questions of great interest were discussed, with as 
much ability as vehemence, by the Vice-President of the Congress, 
Prof. Lipps, of Munich. One of his papers was a very important con- 
tribution in the sadly neglected field of the sesthetics of visual form. I 
can do no more than recommend his paper in the Congress “ Proceed- 
ings” (to appear very soon) to those who are concerned with elementary 
æsthetie principles. The other topic was the much-discussed one on 
the “ Unconscious” in psychology. The question, Can mental states 
be unconscious? has a peculiar fascination, because of the great number 
of verbal distinctions of which it admits. It must be confessed that 
Prof. Lipps’s paper did not make the number of these verbal distinctions 
less. He reaches a sort of return to the soul-substance theory—a 
hidden thing in which mental states, and especially tendencies of an 
active kind, may be preserved when we are not conscious of them. 
This has long ago been refuted as a general conception, I think; but 
the main point of interest, and that for which I bring the matter up, 
is that the results of pathology, dual consciousness, “‘ multiple person- 
ality,” ete., which are considered by many as giving the strongest. evi- 
dence for the “unconscious,” require quite a different theory. The 
“ unconscious ” of the pathologists is a body of conscious data gathered 
into a new and secondary consciousness of its own. While these states 
of mind are not conscious to the major person—and so, by a certain 
license, are called “ unconscious ”—still it is just the evidence that they 
are conscious in their own way and in their own seat in the nervous 
