1896.] Psychotogy. 949 
Prof. Titchener in treating of the subjectin his Psychology? endeav- 
ors to avoid this ambiguity by discarding the terms pleasure and pain, 
and using pleasantness and unpleasantness instead. Apart from his 
terminology, Prof. Titchener’s discussion is of special interest from the 
fact that, although an earnest follower of Wundt in most respects, he 
recognizes feeling or affection, as a distinct element of consciousness. 
Wundt reduces all consciousness (aside from the active) to a single 
element, sensation ; Prof. Titchener restricts sensation to the cognitive 
side of consciousness, and makes affection a distinct and co-ordinate 
term. 
The mind, or consciousness, he says, “ not only senses: it feels. It 
not only receives impressions and has sensations : it receives impressions 
in a certain way.. . . Life means the balance of power (more or less 
effective) in the perpetual conflict of two opposing forees—growth and 
ecay. No impression can be made upon the living body that does 
not tend in some way to change this balance.. . . It must help 
either to build up nervous substance or to break it down. The organ- 
ism is a whole: and what effects it in either of these ways at one part, 
must affect it as a whole, in all. The conscious processes correspond- 
ing to the general bodily processes thus set up by stimuli—processes 
not confined to definite bodily organs—are termed affections. . . 
There are only two bodily processes to give rise to affective pronio : : 
the building-up process (anabolism) and the breaking-down process 
(catabolism). We should expect, then, to find no more than two qual- 
ities of affection ; and introspection tells us that expectation is correct. 
The anabolic bodily processes correspond to the conscious quality of 
pleasantness, catabolic processes to that of unpleasantness. 
Prof. Titchener then examines the relation of affection to sensation. 
“The processes of pleasantness and unpleasantness seem, at least in 
many cases, to bear a strong resemblance to certain concrete experi- 
ences which we have analyzed, provisionally, as complexes of sensa- 
tions. Thus pleasantness may suggest health, drowsiness, bodily com- 
fort; and unpleasantness pain, discomfort, overtiredness, ete. . . 
Now there can be no doubt of the resemblance in the instances cited. 
But the reason of it is simply this, that health, drowsiness and bodil 
comfort are pleasant, i. e., that pleasantness is one of the constituent 
processes, running alongside of various sensation processes, in the total 
conscious experience which we call ‘ health,’ etc. ; and that pain, bodily 
discomfort and overtiredness are unpleasant, i. e., that unpleasantness 
is one of the processes contained in each of these complex experiences. 
3 An Outline of Psychology, by E. B. Titchener, Chap. V. 
