950 The American Naturalist. [November, 
Beyond this there is no resemblance: a sensation process is radically 
different from a pleasantness or an unpleasantness.” This difference 
appears in several ways: 
(1). The sensation is looked upon as belonging to the object which 
gives rise to it, while the affection is regarded as belonging to the sub- 
ject or conscious self.. “ Blue seems to belong to the sky; but the 
pleasantness of the blue is in me. Warmth seems to belong to the 
burning coals; but the pleasantness of warmth is in me. . e 
distinction is unhesitatingly drawn in popular thought, and clearly 
shown in language. It points to a real difference between sensation 
and affection as factors in mental experience—a difference which the 
psychologist must make explicit in his definition of the two processes. 
The same difference is observed even when we compare the affective 
processes with those sensations which are occasioned from within, by a 
change in the state of the bodily organ. The unpleasantness of tooth- 
ache is far more personal to me than the pain of it. The pain is ‘in 
tae tooth ;’ the unpleasantness is as wide as consciousness.” 
(2). If a stimulus be long continued, the affection, if it is not of such 
a character as to pass over into pain, in the end becomes indifferent, 
while the sensation remains as strong and clear as ever, when the at- 
tention is directed to it. ‘* Nervous substance, at the same time that 
it is very impressionable, is eminently adaptable. The organism ad- 
justs itself to its circumstances—resigns itself, so to say, to their inevit- 
ableness. When once adaptation or adjustment to surroundings is 
complete, the surroundings cease to be taken either pleasantly or un- 
pleasantly ; their impressions are simply received, passively and un- 
feelingly 
(3). “ The more closely we attend to a sensation, the clearer does it 
become, and the longer and more accurately do we remember it. We 
cannot attend ws an affection at all. If we attempt to do so, the pleasant- 
ness or unpl at once eludes us and disappears, and we find our- 
` selves attending to some obttosive sensation or idea which we had no 
desire to observe.” 
(4). “ As a general rule, ‘ central’ sensations are much fainter and 
weaker than ‘ peripheral.’ A remembered noise has hardly anything 
of the intensity of the noise as heard. Affection can originate in the 
same two ways. But ‘central’ pleasantness and unpleasantness are 
not only as DEES as—they are in very many cases stronger tban 
— peripheral.’ 
“ We see, then,” concludes Prof. Titchener, “ that there are strong 
reasons for regarding affection as different from sensation. It must be 
