252 The American Naturalist [M arch, 



condition represented by high consciousness. They have instinct and 

 little else. Now, I think the Preformist can account for instinct also, 

 but that is beside the point; what I wish to say now is that, if Epigen- 

 esis were true, we should all be, to the extent to which both parents do 

 the same acts (as, for example, speech) in the condition of the creatures 

 who do only certain things and do them by instinct. I should like to 

 ask of the Neo-Lamarckian : What is it that is peculiar about the 

 strain of heredity of certain creatures that they should be so remark- 

 ably endowed with instincts? Must he not say in some form that the 

 nervous substance of these creatures has been 'set' in the creatures' 

 ancestors? But the question of instinct is touched upon under the 



2. (6 of Cope's table). " Habitual movements are derived from 

 conscious experience." This may mean movements habitual to the in- 

 dividual or to the species in question. If it refers to the individual it 

 may be true on either doctrine, provided we once get the child started 

 on the movement— the point discussed under the preceding head. If, 

 on the other hand, habitual movements mea 

 the question of race habits, best typified in i 

 Cope that most race habits are dn 

 place ; and making that our supposition, again we ask : Can one who 

 believes it still be a Preformist? I should again say that he could. 

 The problem set to the Preformist would not in this case differ from 

 that which he has to solve in accounting for development generally : 

 it would not be altered by the postulate that consciousness is present in 

 the individual. He can say that consciousness is a variation, and what 

 the individual does by it is * preformed ' in this variation. And then 

 what later generations do through their consciousness is all preformed 

 in the variations which they constitute on the earlier variations. In 

 other words, I do not see that the case is made any harder for the Pre- 



a real agent. And I think we may go further and say that the case 

 is easier for him when we take into account the phenomena of Social 

 Heredity. In children, for example, there are variations in their 

 mobility, plasticity, etc. ; in short, in the ease of operation of Social 

 Heredity as seen in the acquisition of particular functions. Children 

 are notoriously different in their aptitudes for acquiring speech, for 

 example ; some learn faster, better, and more. Let us say that this is 

 true in animal communities generally ; then these most plastic individ- 

 uals will be preserved to do the advantageous things for which their 

 them to be the most fit. And the next generation will 



