DEVELOPMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 



Speculum Mentis (7), and for a statement of 

 the theory of science here adopted, the 

 chapters on science in his work are much 

 more than adequate. It is easy to see 

 how the experimental advances which 

 have been collected together in this paper 

 fit in with the neo-mechanistic attitude. 

 The organic theory of nature, which seems 

 to have so great a future before it, is the 

 natural counterpart in philosophy of 

 neo-mechanism in biology and what we 

 know of the thermodynamic aspects of 

 living things gives us little reason for 

 supposing that the laws we have now are 

 likely to break down in biology in the 

 future. Neo-mechanism gives biological 

 science all it wants and at the same time 

 is not easy to attack from a philosophical 

 angle, for the simple reason that it makes 

 no philosophical claims. 



It may be noted that such a standpoint 

 will not necessarily object to special 

 "biological" laws or explanations, pro- 

 vided that these are clearly understood to 

 possess an "interim" character and to 

 be only awaiting expression in physico- 

 chemical terms. There is no harm in 

 classing the poppy with other therapeutic 

 plants as having the "virtus dormitiva" 

 of Galen and of Moliere, provided Over- 

 ton's theory and all its more accurate suc- 

 cessors follow close behind. To say that 

 opium possesses a "dormitive faculty" is 

 a mere restatement of the facts but to say 

 that it does so because morphine is fat- 

 soluble is at least intelligible even though 

 it may not be true. It promises truth 

 to come. But this is not to admit the 

 value of "special biological laws" con- 

 ceived in terms of "activity, purpose, 

 values" etc. and never intended to be 

 reduced to physico-chemical intelli- 

 gibility. Such generalizations as these 

 still find defenders, e.g. J. H. Woodger 

 (57). "Because mechanics," he says, 

 "quite rightly banishes 'force' and 'ac- 



tivity' from its conceptual equipment as 

 mere anthropomorphism, is it correct to 

 turn this deanthropomorphizing process 

 on avdpwwos himself?" The answer is 

 yes, if iivdpoiTos is to be an object of 

 scientific study, for a strenuous tendency 

 against projections of ourselves into the 

 external world is one of the principal 

 characteristics of the scientific method. 

 There exists here a confusion of philoso- 

 phy and perhaps theology also with 

 science which has caused much trouble in 

 the past and will cause more. kvOpuros 

 not deanthropomorphized is a mixture of 

 all kinds of experience, exact biology, 

 philosophic speculation and argument, 

 religious and artistic appreciation, his- 

 torical understanding. In so far as he is 

 the object of scientific thought, he must 

 be deanthropomorphized: and the legiti- 

 mate aversion to paradoxes which we all 

 feel kept within bounds. 



If, then, for the biologist neo- 

 mechanism seems to fit in best with recent 

 tendencies in the theory of the study of 

 living things, the future becomes clearer 

 than before. There is nothing save the 

 inherent difficulties of research to hinder 

 the advance of exact physico-chemical 

 methods in biology, and these obstacles 

 have never yet daunted the enthusiasm 

 of investigators. It was the paper lions 

 of vitalism in their path that made them 

 hesitate; the fruit of minds overprone to 

 regard as inexplicable that which has not 

 been explained. At the same time, the 

 frank rejection of that philosophy which 

 regarded the scientific method as the only 

 one capable of revealing truth establishes 

 the claim of modern biology to metaphysi- 

 cal respectability. Biology can claim to 

 be well aware of the limitations inherent 

 in the method of science, and of the 

 illimitability of the subject-matter to 

 which it can be applied. 



James Johnstone, in a recent paper 





